United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

ORIGINAL WITH PROOF OF SERVICE

76-1034

B P/S

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the

SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff-Appellee,

HARRY D. IACONETTI,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

LEON DICKER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
400 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10017

MAR 19 1976

** OANIEL FUSARO, CLERT

SECOND CARCUIT

DAVID G. TRAGER
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Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
United States Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brookly 1, New 17k

(5376)

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DOCKET ENTRIES

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	COUN ZCC A-2
DATE	PROCEEDINGS
-12-75	Notice of Motion filed, ret. May 22, 1975, for Bill of Particulars,
	for dismissal, suppression, etc.
/19/75	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called- Motion to adjourn trial date, etc. argue
-	granted- deft waives right to a speedy trial-trial adjd to 6/14/75 at 9:45
	A.M. for trial
5-22-	75 Before WEINSTEIN J - case called & adjd to June 16,1975
	(for trial) and for dismissal of the Indictment.
30/75	Copy of Letter to Judge Watson from Leon Dicker dated 5/28/75 filed
-2-75	Before WATSON J - case called - trial set down for June 16, 1975
-0-	at 9:30 am.
	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called - Case transferred to Judge Watson
16/75	Before WATSON, J Case called - Deft's atty present - Deft's motion for inspe
	of trand jury minutes-decision reserved- Deft's motion to dismiss indictm
	for failure to state fact to consittute an offense-decision reserved0
	Deft's motion to dismiss indiment on grounds of prejudice of deft's rig
-	denied- deft's motion to suppress recordings-denied- deft's motion to suppr
7-21-75	recordings denied- On motion of deft trial adjd to 7/21/75 at 9:30 A.M. Before WATSON J - adjd to July 23, 1975 at 9:30 am(for trial)
28/75	Before WATSON, J Case called - Deft not present - counsel present - case adjd
	to 8/18/75 at 10:00 A.M. for trial .
127/75	By WEINSTEIN, J. ORDER se ting down pre-trial conference for 9/8/75
20 54	at 9:30 A.M. filed. (Copies mailed to attornies.) 4HN
9-8-75	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty Leon Dicker present -
	defts motion to dismiss the indictment argued and denied - So Ordered.
1 3 %	Pre Trial Conference held and concluded - trial set for Oct. 8,1975
	at 9:30 am.
9/75	Letter from A.U.S.A. Dearie and accompanying copy of letter to Judge
	Watson filed
/3/75	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called- deft not present-counsel present-deft's
	application for adjournment of trial-argued and denied
	efore WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & counse! L. Dicker present -
	Trial ordered and Begun - Jurors selected and sworn - trial contd to
	Oct. 10, 1975., at 10:30 am
710773	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called- deft and counsel present- trial resumed
	trial contd to 10/14/75 at 10:00 A.M.
*	LITEL CONCE CO 10/14//5 at 10:00 A.M.
*	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & counsel present - trial

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75	CR 277	
	CRIMINAL	DOCKET

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
. 10/15/7	The state of the s
	Govt rests-deft's motion to dismiss denied-trial coutd to 10/16/75
10-16-7	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty present -trail
	resumed - trial contd to Oct. 17, 1975
10-17-7	5 Before WEINSTEIN J - Case called - deft & counsel present - trial
	resumed - Harry Iaconetti called and sworn as witness for his
	own behalf - trial contd to Oct. 20, 1975.
10-20-	5 Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & counsel present - trial
	resumed - Harry Iaconitti resumes as witness for his own behalf -
,	deft rests - Govt rests - trial contd to Oct 21, 1975 @ 10:00 am.
10-21-	75 5 volumes of stenographers transcripts filed (pgs 136 to 856)
	xkamxMukxkhinix
10-21-7	5 Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty Mr.Dickman
	present - trial resumed - deft sums up - Govt sums up - alternates
	discharged - order of sustenance signed for Lunch - court charges
	Jury - Marshals sworn - jury retires for deliberation at 3:10 PM -
	Jury returns at 4:25 Pm with a verdict of guilty as to counts 1 to
	5 incl. Jury polled an discharged - defts motion to set aside the
	verdict is denied - trial contluded - bail contd - sentence adjd
il	without date.
10-21-79	By WEINSTEIN J - Order of sustenance signed (lunch)
	Stenographers Transcript dated 10/21/75 filed
2-8-75	Letter filed dated Dec. 5 received from Chambers from Leon Dicker.
	Atty for deft. (adjourning sentence date from Dec. 12 to Dec.19,
	1975) So ordered by Judge Weinstein(see notation of Judge Weinstein
	at bottom of letter.)
2/12/75	
2-19-75	AL 7:30 A
1	at 9:30 am
2/15/75	Letter . and 12/10/25 filed from L. Dicker to J. Weinseein.
12/19/75	DV WEIGHT ETF II - under dered 12 16/75 filed www.confirming 111
	of servencing of defe to 1/1/15 (Order signed on above letter)
1/7/76	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called - deft and counsel present-deft's motion
	to dismiss counts 3 and 5 is granted without prejudice on condition that
	the govt may move to reinstate the verdict-deft's motion for new trial
	denied-deft advised of right to appeal- deft sentenced to imprisonment
	for a period of 4 years on each of counts 1,2 and 4 to run concurrently
* '	stey of exeuction of sentence pending appeal granted
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1	PROCEEDINGS	
	Judgment and Commitment filed- certified copies to Marshal	
191	By WEINSTEIN J - Memorandum and order filed denying motion of	
7	deft for a new trial.	
6	Notice of Appeal filed.	
5	Docket entries and duplicate of Notice mailed to the Court of	- 1
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INDICTMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Wurster J

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

HARRY DOMINICK LACONETTI,

Defendant.

INDICTMENT

Cr. No. SCR 277
(Title 18, U.S.C. §201(c) and Title 18, U.S.C. §1951)

4-8-75

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

On or about the 10th day of February, 1975 and the 11th day of February, 1975, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI, being a public official as defined in Section 201(a), Title 18, United States Code, did knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, directly and corruptly ask and solicit from Champion Envelope Manufacturing Company, Inc. approximately Nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$9500.) for himself in return for the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI'S being influenced in the performance of his official acts. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(c))

COUNT TWO

On or about the 24th day of February, 1975, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI, being a public official as defined in Section 201(a), Title 18, United States Code, did knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, directly and corruptly accept and receive from Champion Envelope Manufacturing Company, Inc. approximately Three Thousand Dollars (\$3000.) for himself in return for the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI'S being influenced in the performance of his official acts. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(c))

COUNT THREE

From on or about the 10th day of February, 1975 up to and including the 24th day of February, 1975, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly attempt to obstruct, delay and affect commerce, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by attempting extortion, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, in that the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI attempted to obtain a sum of money not due him or his office from and with the consent of Champion Envelope Manufacturing Company, Inc., such consent to be induced under color of official right and by fear of economic loss. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951)

COUNT FOUR

On or about and between the 15th day of October,
1974 and the 1st day of December, 1974, both dates being
approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of
New York, the defendant HARRY DOMINICK JACONETTI, being a public
official as defined in Section 201(a), Title 18, United States
Code, did knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, directly and
corruptly ask and solicit from Lightalarms Electronics
Corporation, a sum of money for himself in return for the
defendant HARRY DOMINICK JACONETTI'S being influenced in the
performance of his official acts. (Title 18, United States
Code, Section 201(c))

On or about and between the 15th day of October, 1974 and the 1st day of December, 1974, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly attempt to obstruct, delay and affect commerce, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by attempting extortion, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, in that the defendant HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI attempted to obtain a sum of money not due him or his office from and with the consent of Lightalarms Electronics Corporation, such consent to be induced under color of official right and by fee of economic loss. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951).

A TRUE BILL

FOREMAN.

DAVID G. TRAGER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Goldman-direct 1 General Services Administation? 2 3 Yes, I am. Could you tell us, Mr. Goldman, whether or not you had occasion in February of this year to discuss that 5 proposed contract with members of your firm? 6 7 Yes, I did. 8 Who sir, was that? Mr. Lioi, president of the company, and Mr. 9 10 Babiuk, executive vice president. 11 Mr. Goldman, if I may direct your specific attention to February 10, 1975, did you have on that day 12 13 the occasion to discuss with Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk a proposed government contract in your office of chairman? 14 15 MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I object to the form of the question unless any testimony that Mr. Goldman 16 17 offers has to do with what was made in the presence 18 of the defendant Harry Iaconetti. 19 THE COURT: Overruled. 20 MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I would like to be heard on that particular point if I may because 21 22 everything he testifies to I am going to object to. 23 THE COURT: You may have a continuing objection. MR. DICKER: Yes your Honor, but more than a 24 25 continuing objection, in this particular situation

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Goldman-direct

I think that that testimony and totally and absolutely hearsay and I would like to be heard on that outside the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: Do you have a brief or cases on it?

MR. DICKER: No your Honor, I do not have a

brief or cases but I have the applicable law and

certain statements I would like to get on the record

relative to that.

THE COURT: All right, do you want me to ask the jury to leave?

MR. DICKER: Yes your Honor.

THE COURT: The jury will be excused, ladies and gentlemen.

(The jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Yes, I will hear you.

MR. DICKER: Thank you sir.

Your Honor, I understand that this testimony is being offered by the Government in rebuttal and and is to cover some of the testimony that Mr.

Lioi and Mr. Babiuk told to Mr. Goldman outside the presence of Mr. Iaconetti, the defendant.

I think that is hearsay and should not be admissible and is grossly prejudicial to the rights of Mr. Iaconetti and I do not think it is permissible

Goldman-direct

under 803 subdivision 24.

Unfortunately, there are no cases that I have been able to come up with over the weekend or my assistant relative to this other than what appears in the bound volume of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We have a very serious problem relative to Mr. Iaconetti's rights under this situation.

Now, under 803.24, there are certain requirements that are necessary and any testimony that

Mr. Goldman might offer relative to his conversations
outside the hearing or the presence of Mr. Iaconetti
do not fit those particular exceptions so that they
would be exceptions to the normal hearsay rule.

I certainly think in a situation like this when he is involved in this particular trial on these charges, that is grossly prejudicial to permit this testimony to come in.

Now what happened here in this case? There was a denial by Mr. Iaconetti of certain statements made by Messrs. Lioi and Babiuk and I do not think that that denial is such an attack on the credibility of a witness as to qualify under this particular section.

One other factor which disturbs me greatly in this situation is that there the government is

bringing in absolute hearsay testimony relative to conversations between officers and members of a particular corporation which although it may bear to a degree on what Mr. Lioi says, it does not satisfy the requirement in order to come under this particular exception.

I again respectfully submit from any of the research I have been able to come up with, I do not find there has been a satisfaction at least of the four convictions relative to the use of a 803 subdivision 24, as yet.

There has not yet been shown by the government it is necessary to do that and a reading of the committee's report, and a reading of the notes of

both the House committee and the Senate

Committee and the joint conference committee prior

to the adoption of this particular rule, indicates

that it should be used very rarely in a critical

trial such as this and I am concerned about the

preservation of his rights and his constitutional

guarantees.

The one use of a case which is cited under the note to paragraph 24 refe B to a case, Dallas County against Comme rial Union Association Company,

Ltd., which is cited in 286 P 388 in the 5th

Circuit and is illustrative of the point. That
involves an insurnace case and it is a question of

whether or not a tower was struck by lightening in

which case it will be covered by insurance or whether
it had falled down because of a structural weakness

or other deterioration not covered.

(Cont'd on next page.)

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(The jury is in the jury box.)

THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, the fact
that an objection is made, and I overruled it, has no
bearing on your deliberations, you understand that.
The defense counsel did exactly what he should have
done in objecting. He made his point. We wanted to
argue it at length, and that is why you were excused.
The fact you were excused should give no added weight
to this testimony, or the objection. Is that clear?

Any further instruction?

MR. DICKER: No, thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. DEARIE: (continued)

Q I believe, before we broke I asked you if there came a time, sir, on February 10, 1975, when you had an occasion to discuss with Mr. Lioi and Mr. Bibiuk the then in progress Pre-Award Survey?

A Yes.

Q Could you tell us at what time approximately you first discussed the survey with Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk?

A Approximately 11:30, quarter to 12:00. That morning.

Q Could you tell us approximately where you were, and where this conversation took place?

A-15 Goldman - direct

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A In Mr. Babiuk's office.

Q When you say "we,"?

A Mr. Lioi, Mr. Babiuk and myself.

Now, sir, if you will, as best you can recall, will you relate to the Court and Jury that conversation that took place, you say, at approximately 11:30 in Mr. Babiuk's office on February 10, 1975?

A Mr. Babiuk had been in closed-door conferences with Mr. Iaconetti through the morning, discussing the contract, discussing our ability to handle the contract, and any of the questions that he might have pertaining to the Survey.

I had asked Mr. Babiuk how the meeting had gone and he said, "We have many problems that Mr. Iaconetti had said were placing roadblocks in our being awarded the contract."

I asked him what were the specific problems that had been mentioned or raised in the meeting, and he said, "I have not been able to get any specific points that Mr. Iaconetti could raise as a reason for our not being awarded the contract."

In fact, the only particular specific point that Mr. Iaconetti reported to Mr. Babiuk through the morning was the lack of an up-to-date form that was used in executing the contract.

Other than that, there was no other specific, and I told him that through the day he should press to find

out the reason why we may not be awarded the contract.

Q Mr. Goldman, did that conclude your conversation of Monday morning between yourself and Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk?

A Yes.

Q Subsequent to that conversation, did you have additional conversation with Mr. Babiuk and Mr. Lioi on February 10th with respect to the Pre-Award Survey?

A Approximately 1:30 in the afternoon, when Mr. Babiuk and Mr. Iaconetti returned from lunch --

Q Where did this conversation take place?

A This took place, I believe, in Mr. Babiuk's office.

Q Do you recall, was Mr. Lioi present as well as yourself?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you as best you can recall, relate to the Court and Jury that conversation that took place on the afternoon of February 10, 1975?

A I had asked Mr. Babiuk whether he was able to find out whether or not — whether any of the problems that were mentioned could be specifically tied down, and Mr. Babiuk reported to me that he again could not find any specific reasons for Mr. Iaconetti saying that we would not be awarded the

contract.

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It was decided then that Mr. --

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I object to what was decided.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q Tell us, if you can recall, the conversation specifically.

THE COURT: I just want to know what was reported to this witness as the defendant's statement. That's all I want to know.

I don't want what was in their minds, or anything else.

- Q In view of what the Court has said, what was reported to you during this meeting with respect to statements by Mr. Iaconetti?
 - A That was the sum total of it.
- Q Now, Mr. Goldman, subsequent to this second meeting, did you have still another occasion to discuss with Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk the Pre-Award Survey on February 10, 1975?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Could you tell us when that took place?
 - A Approximately 4:45 that afternoon.
 - Q Where did that conversation take place, if you

can recall?

- A I can't recall which office it took place in.
- Q Okay.

Now, Mr. Goldman, could you relate to us as best you can recall, that conversation in the context of what, if anything, Mr. Iaconetti said -- Withdrawn.

Can you relate to us that cor ersation as to the context of what Mr. Iaconetti's specific words were?

A Mr. Lioi reported to me that he had had a lengthy conversation with Mr. Iaconetti in Mr. Lioi's office, he reported to me that he had discussed at length the reasons why we might not be swarded the contract.

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I object to that response. He should be devoting himself to saying just what Mr. Iaconetti said, and not paraphrasing —

THE COURT: I will take this. When we get to the more critical parts, we will go into it, and you may cross-examine.

A I was told that we could not be awarded the contract unless we could overcome certain problems, and the problems were basically in the form of hurdles that existed within the General Services Administration, that could be overcome by a payment of approximately 1 to 1 1/2 percent of the contract that was won by us by being low bidder.

Goldman - direct

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Lioi have occasion to tell you anything that the defendant specificially said?

Would be divided among some people within the General Services Administration, would help to remove the problems that existed in being awarded the contract, and further, such payments for this contract, and perhaps in the future, would help us win other contracts that could be awarded without competitive. bidding, als I was told that this was not something that was that unique, it had taken place over the history of the General Services Administration, and perhaps it goes back 200 years, in terms of the method of awarding contracts, and the fact that oftentimes the lowest bidder doesn't often win it, but there is someone who can be awarded a contract without necessarily being low bidder, by virtue of making such payments.

MR. DEARIE: I have nothing further.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. DICKER:

Q Mr. Goldman, 4:45 P.M. you just testified Mr. Lioi reported certain facts to you relative to a conversation he has with Mr. Iaconetti in his office, is that correct?

A That is correct.

You said this had been certainly going on for

2	over a long period of time in the Gener 1 Services Administra-
я	tion as to the awarding of contracts?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Just what did Mr. Lioi say to you?
6	A Mr. Lioi had told me
7	Q What did he say to you in so many words?
8	A Mr. Iaconetti had told him that was a prevalent
9	act.
10	Q Did he say anything further, other than it was
11	a prevalent act?
12	A Yes. It had gone back over many, many years,
13	and not something that originated with this particular con-
14	tract.
15	Q How long had it been going on?
16	A It could go back to the time I seem to recall
17	the time that the first rifle was sold to the Government.
18	Q Mr. Lioi say anything to you? Anything else to
19	you?
20	A With reference to what?
21	Q That conversation at 4:45 as to what Mr. Iaconett
22	said to hia?
23	A I believe I recalled all of the pertinent facts
24	that took place during that conversation.

Did Mr. Iaconetti -- I'm sorry, sir, Did Mr. Liqi

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Goldman - cross

say to you wh	ether or n	ot Mr.	Iaconnet	i had def	initely	r said
that Champion	Envelope	would	not get a	favorable	Plant	Facil-
ities Report?				.*	7.73	

I can't recall.

Do you recall whether Mr. Lioi said to you that he was doubtful whether you would get a successful Plant Facilities Report?

Yes.

Did he indicate to you whether he thought you had a chance to get a favorable Plant Facilities Report?

Yes. If we made payment of certain sums of money.

Do you know, on February 11th that Mr. Iaconetti's conversations were being taped?

Yes.

Did you hear the tapes?

No.

They were made in your office, and you never Q heard them?

No, I did not.

MR. DICKER: I have no further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Step down.

Any other witnesses?

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EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT--TESTIMONY OF MORRIS STERN MR. DEAIRE: One more. The Government calls

Mr. Morris Stern.

(continued on next page:)

R2 fls

	851
n2 MP:BD 1	MORRIS STERN, a witness called on behalf
2	of the United States of America, was sworn by the
3	Clerk of the Court and testified as follows:
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. DEARIE:
6	Q Mr. Stern, would you tell the Court nad jury
7	what your present occupation is?
6	A I am an attorney at law.
	Q How long have you been admitted and
10	approximately where?
11	A Ten years in the State of New Jersey.
12	O Do you know a company by the name of Champion
13	Envelope?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Are they a client of yours?
16	A Yes, they are.
17	Q Do you know Mr. Michael Lioi?
18	A Yes.
19	Q Mr. Stern, may I take you bake to February,
20	1975, sir?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Do you recall during that menth receiving a
23	telephone call from Mr. Mike Lioi?
24	A Yes, I do.
25	Q Could you approximate when you received that

Stern-direct

call?

A I received several calls from Mike Lioi in that month. The first one that I recall was related to — well, if I can start it this way, he called me after dinner one evening at my home. It was towards nine, ten o'clock I believe. He indicated that someone from GSA —

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, what he indicated -I think he should say what he said.

THE COURT: Tell us to the extent you can what was said.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Lioi said that an individual from GSA had been in the factory that day and that the individual had been there for purposes of doing a pre avard survey with regard to a contract that Champion had bid on.

This individual had at one point in the day asked him directly for money. I believe the amount was \$12,000. And that that money was to feather the bed and give Champion that contract.

Re also indicated that --

MR. DICKER: What did he say?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. He also said that the man offered him a deal with regard to future contracts.

Stern-direct

Q I take it at some point in the conversation
Mr. Lioi sought your advice?

A Yes. Mr. Lioi said that he was -- he either said he had prepared his office or was in the process of,

I don't recall, preparing his office with some type of recording device and going to have the man from GSA back in the office and going to record the conversation.

He also asked my advice with regard to what authorities he should contact.

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I object to that.

He should be restricted to what Mr. Iaconetti said and not what Mr. Lioi said. This certainly has no bearing --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DEARIE: I have nothing further, your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. DICKER:

Q Do you recall, Mr. Stern, whether or not Mr. Lioi said he had the according device in his office?

A I am not -- I don't recall whether he said that he had set it up or would set it up. I don't recall that.

Q You had no recollection whether it was

Stern-cross:

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operative on February 10?

On the night he called me, I don't recall if he said it was then operative or would be the next day.

MR. DICKER: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. DEARIE: The Government rests.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. DICKER: No.

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. You have heard all of the evidence in the case. Tomorrow we will hear arguments. You will hear the charge and then ou will begin your deliberations. I want you to inform your families that you might be late tomorrow. I don't know what the situation is but tell them to be flexible about when you are coming home.

Be here please at 10:00 o'clock. Don't discuss the case and keep an open mind.

Thank you and good night.

(The jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I will hear you.

MR. DICKER: Thank you, sir.

Your Honor, at this time I would like to renew all the motions that I made on the conclusion of the

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Stern-cross

Government's case particularly I would like to move for a judgment of acquittal on all the counts in the indictment. Specifically I would like to devote me attention to counts 3 and 5 which deal with extortion. In those particular counts I reiterate the Government has failed to establish that all the necessary ingredients required in Title 18, Section 1951 have been met and on that basis the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

Further, in Count 4, which deals with the solicitation of a bribe from the Lightalarms Electronics Corporation. I renew that aspect of the motion for hte Government's failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a solicitation under Section 2010 Title 18 with reference to the Lightalarms Electronics Corporation.

Finally, I renew the motion relative to

Counts 1 and 2 as dealing with the Champion Envelope

Company.

THE COURT: Denied in all respects.

MR. DICKER: Exception.

THECOURT: Anything further, gentlemen?

MR. DEARIE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: You have all seen the redone

A-28

EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT--PORTIONS OF COURT'S STATEMENT RELATIVE TO REBUTTAL PROCEDURES

.JBhb

Iaconetti-direct

THE COURT: Now, I must say that I was somewhat startled by the defendant's flat denials that these conversations had taken place both in Champion and in the Lightarams place of business with a number of people. In view of what was on the tapes, I had expected him to give some other explanation.

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, he was -- I'm sorry, sir.

the Government may want to consider whether it wishes to offer the testimony of other members of the firms. In the case of Sonner, whether Sonner, after the conversation went back and discussed it with his relatives, and what was said and what the report was at the time. And in the case of Lioi and Babiuk, the same thing, whether there was discussion about the Champion offic als with respect to what to do and what was reported.

Now, there are a variety of theories that you might want to consider. I don't know what counsel for both sides would want to do about it.

There is, of course, Rule 801(1)(b), that is, testimony which is consistent with his testimony in his offer to rebut an express charge of recent

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fabrication. A cortemporaneous report, that is, what was said, of course, comes under such a rule.

There is also 801(d)(2)C: A statement by a person authorized by him to make statements concerning the subject.

If a person asks another person for a bribe, and it's understood that he will have to get consent of his partners to pay the bribe, query, whether that is not an implied or direct authorization to take it up with the partners and to transmit the information to the partners.

There is also Rule 804-24, which is the general exception. That requires that notice be given.

And if the Government, therefore, proposes to use this type of rebuttal evidence on Monday -- and I will permit you to go over it if you want. If I should decide it will come in, you will have to give the defendant notice today.

I am prepared to rule on the preliminary quesas required of the Court under Rule 80. if the Government wants to proceed in this way. Bu: I think that the Government had better consider seriously what it wants to do, and so had the defendant.

MR. DEARIE: Your Honor, if --

1	Iaconetti-direct 490
2	THE COURT: So we can discuss it.
3	Well, you needn't decide it now. We are going
4	to have to take a break.
5	MR. DICKER: I want to say relative to this,
6	the conversations testified to by Mr. Iaconetti took
7	place on February 10th when there were no tapes. And
8	there are no tapes relative to this, so that
9	THE COURT: I understand. That's exactly the
10	point.
11	MR. DICKER: Fine.
12	THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.
13	(Recess taken.)
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EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
ARGUMENT RE ADMISSIBILITY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

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MR. DICKER: It is one thing to be concerned about money, it is another thing to be concerned about the constitutional guarantees that the defendant is entitled to. I think that the waiver of the hearsay rule in this particular case would be grossly prejudicial and I object strenuously to the admission of any evidence of such a nature.

MR. DEARIE: Very briefly, your Honor, of course it is our positica that the testimony of Mr. Goldman, which will be limited to conversations between himself or amongst himself, Mr. Babiuk and Mr. Lioi, is not hearsay, by definition, under Section 801. It is going to concern or introduce statements of Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk that would be consistent with their testimony and will, of course, be offered to rebut the express charge made here during the course of this trial of recent fabrication. Initially, this brief testimony from Mr. Goldman and in a minute from Mr. Stern, will relate to statements by Mr. Lioi and Mr. Babiuk and therefore are not hearsay. I might simply state that 803.24, of course, and both the Senate and House notes on that make it very clear that exists for the purpose of allowing the District Court and the trial court to apply it to any situation where he deems it appropriate and where the potential hearsay

has independent probative value and may rule admitting such evidence and we can rely on that. We need not rely on it, this is simply by definition not hearsay.

MR. DICKER: One further word. Relative to 801, the definition of hearsay, it is set forth in 801 as Mr. Dearie says. However, I dispute with Mr. Dearie as to what he says relative to this not being hearsay based on 801(d), Subdivision (1), either (a) or (b). Again, we are dealing with the situation where this is hearsay testimony violative of his rights and entirely prejudicial and that is the basis for my objection.

THE COURT: Motion to exclude is denied.

of U.S. vs. Annunziato 293 F. 273, cert. denied, 368, U.S. 919-1961, opinion of Judge Friendly.

It is highly probative and relevant and therefore it comes within Rule 401. Prejudice does not over-balance probative force and therefore Rule 403 does not apply.

Under Rule 801 (d) (1) (B):

These statements, which I take it the witness will testify to indicating what Lioi said consistent with Lioi's testimony and offered to relut an expressed or implied charge against him of fabrication, improper

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influence or motive. Here motive is clearly involved.

In addition, it come under 801 (d) (2) (C) as "a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject."

I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did make a request for a bribe on Pebruary 10 and that he did authorize the witness Lioi to take the matter up with his associates in order to get his associates' permission to pay that bribe, and I find that the transcript of the 11th confirmed that belief.

Therefore the statements are authorized admissions of the defendant under this rule.

803 (24) applies in "that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact," and I so find.

- "(B) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." I so find. This is the most powerful evidence of what was said in view of the straight conflict between the chief witness for the prosecution, Lioi, and the defendant, with respect to what happened on the critical date of Pebruary 10th.
- "(C) The general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by

admission of the statement into evidence."

We have here a clear conflict of credibility and the jury is entitled to get such evidence on the point and to decide the issue itself.

In addition, I find that the Government gave the defendant under the circumstances ample advance notice of the intention to offer the statement. That notice was given Friday, which was the first date really upon which it could have been concluded that this kind of evidence would have been needed.

In addition, there is a fourth reason, and that is that the meaning of the words used by the defendant on February 10, the critical date, depends to a considerable extent on body motions and whether he was laughing or whether he was winking, whether his tone of voice would give color and meaning to words which otherwise would be neutral.

Even the words "I don't want to take a bribe and I will not take one" said with a wink and a smile might well be interpreted to mean exactly the opposite. That is apparent when you listen to the recording and belies completely the defendant's statement that he had no such meaning.

It is also important to put it in because we have the statement made by the defendant to the FBI that this

was all a joke and the fact that Lioi on the 10th did not take it as a joke and he took it up with his partners, is entirely probative of the fact it was not intended as a joke.

So that the Rules of Evidence as well as the precedents absolutely require the admission of this evidence and I think it would be a travesty to exclude evidence so entirely probative as this and I will not do it.

If you have an objection and if there should be a conviction I think --

MR. DICKER: Yes, I would like to make my objection.

THE COURT: I think you have a good point on appeal. I am very please you did bring it up because it is a good point.

MR. DICKER: I would like the record to register my objection.

THE COURT: And exception.

MR. DICKER: Thank you.

One other thing. Would your Honor instruct the jury when they come in that the fact that this testimony is going to be taken now is no reflection on the defendant or anything they heard as to the fact that I said I was objecting to it and I think some

statement should be made --

THE COURT: You mean the fact you objected or that it be excluded and has no bearing?

MR. DICKER: Both, your Honor, so there will not be any unusual import as far as the jury is concerned as to the admission of this testimony.

THE COURT: I will be happy to do that. Bring in the jury.

(Continued on next page.)

COURT'S ORAL DECISION PERMITTING INTRODUCTION OF TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS

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MR. DEARIE: Your Honor, preliminarily, before the jury arrives, in the interest of saving time, I have supplied Mr. Dicker this morning with yet another copy of the transcript. I have a copy for the Court.

I advised Mr. Dicker at the time there are very minor red line portions that the Government does not intend to play for the benefit of the jury.

I have red-lined --

THE COURT: Mark them, please.

MR. DEARIE: Mr.Dicker and I have had previously agreed that the tapes and transcripts would be marked in evidence but I understand Mr. Dicker has an application.

MR. DICKER: Yes, prior to the introduction of the tapes, I would move to exclude the tapes under the authority of Esberti against the United States.

THE COURT: What?

MR. DICKER: I have a case which I would refer to you relative to the admission of these particular tapes considering the fact there is a bribery count and there are extortion counts herein and there is one particular case I rely on.

Your Honor, it is Esberti against the United States, 406 Fed. 2d 148.

THE COURT: Page?

MR. DICKER: 148. It's the last paragraph of the case, numbered 11.

THE MFR: Transcript marked as Government's Exhibit 16 in e idence.

MR. DEARIE: We better have this at side bar. (The jury is in the jury box.)

(The following took place at side bar.)

MR. DICKER: In this particular case, the defendants were convicted of a violation of Section 1951, Title 18. On the appeal the conviction was aff ... However, this was a converse situation. Here the defendant had argued that the Court's refusal to admit into evidence the actual tapes of the alleged bribery attempt was error, but the Court said that there was no error -- these tapes are rampant of Counts Two and Four as well as Three and Five and I think the Government has to decide whether it is going under the bribery or extortion charge.

MR. DEARIE: I should note of course I have not been apprised of this. This motion was made prior to trial before Judge Watson to exclude both the tapes and the transcripts. Judge Watson denied the motion as to both the tapes and the transcripts. It seems to me, based upon my overhearing of

Mr. Dicker, he fails to realize one basic fact in this situation, we have a man on trial who is accused of having received the money and the Government does not have to choose a particular theory, bribery vis-a-vis extortion --

THE COURT: The motion is denied. It comes much too late. The jury is already sitting here and we've got all the equipment set up and I am not going to hear this separate motion. In addition, all this material is highly relevant to the state of mind of the defendant and the reason he was making these statements.

Let's continue.

(The following took place in open court.)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We have been working on that other case which is why you have been downstairs.

MR. DEARIE: May we continue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEARIE: The Government calls at this time Mr. Zenon Babiuk.

(continued on next page)

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	1 A-40
1	EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPTPORTIONS OF TESTIMONY OF RALPH DIGIACAMO
	DiGiacamo-cross 66
. 2	inspectors relative to the dollar value?
3	A No, at least, I'm not aware of them.
4	Now, we are talking or we were talking before
5	of the plant racilities report from the Quality Assurance
6	Inspector which goes to his Supervisor; do you refer to him
7	as the Branch Chief?
8	A I don't believe he is, I believe there is a
9	Branch Chief above the Supervisor.
10	Now, does that Branch Chief get to see the plant
11	facilities report?
12	A I'm just going to have to answer that same way
13	as I said before, I don't know of the internal operations of
14	this man's section.
15	Q All right.
16	Then let me ask you this, Mr. DiGiacamo:
17	We talked about the fact that in a bid in the amount of
18	over one million dollars we have to be concerned with a
19	financial report, with compliance with the equal opportunity
20	law, and finally with the plant facilities report.
21	A That is true.
22	Q A, B and C.
23	A Not A, B and C. C, B and A; they are of equal
24	importance.
25	Q They are of equal importance?
1000000	

DiGiacamo-cross Do you have any knowledge of when he made his 2 3 inspections? No. Now, this report is all that he has to do relative to his function as a quality control man. Isn't 6 7 that so? At this particular time, yes, I would agree 9 with that. Would you say that this at least on February 10 11, 1975 was an official report? 1' It says so, yes. 12 MR. DICKER: I have no further questions. 13 MR. DEARIE: Nothing further. 14 THE COURT: Next witness. 15 SONNER, called as a witness, having 16 been first duly sworn by the Clerk of the Court, 17 testified as follo :: 18 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DEARIE: 20 Would you state once again your full name? Q 22 Lou Sonner. By whom are you employed? 23 Lightalarms Electronics Corporation. 24 Do you enjoy any degree of ownership in that 25

1		RIAL TRANSCRIPTPORTIONS OF TESTIMONY OF Sonner-direct 82
2	Q	Do you know by whom that particular survey
3	was conducted	,
4	A	Mr. Iaconetti.
5	Q	Do you see him in this courtroom?
6	A	Yes.
7	0	Please point to him.
8	. A	The gentleman in the center.
9	Q	During this particular pre-award survey, were
10	there any pro	blems or difficulties that you were confronted
11	with?	
12	Α.	No.
13	0	Was a conclusion of capability reached by the
14	quality inspe	ctor?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	Which would be Mr. Iaconetti?
17	A	Yes.
18	0	When did you receive word that you had been
19	awarded a cor	tract?
20	A	October 1st.
21	Q	Of last year I assume?
22	A	Yes.
23	0	With the term to commence when?
24	A	The term beginning November 1st
25	Q	Prior to this time had you had any difficulties

company in regard to the specifications of the contract and

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No.

1 1		Sonner-direct 97
2	Q	Mr. Sonner, did you ever pay Mr. Iaconetti any
3	money in conn	ection with any Government contract?
. 4	A	No.
5	Q	Did you consider paying Mr. Iaconetti in connec-
6	tion with this	particular contract?
7		MR. DICKER: He answered that already. He
8	said h	e was going to give him something Christmastime.
9		THE COURT: Go ahead. That is not quite what he
10	said.	
11	Q	Mr. Sonner, subsequent to this last conversation
12	you described	for us, did there come a time when you did in
13	fact make a re	eport to the
14	A	Yes.
15	Ω	To whom did you i ke the report?
16	A	Mr. Kraft.
17	Q	Following this report to Mr. Kraft, did you
18	hear from Mr.	Iaconetti again?
19	A	No.
20	Q	Did you attempt to contact Mr. Iaconetti?
21	A	No.
22	Q	To your knowledge, did Mr. Iaconetti or anyone
23	acting on his	behalf attempt to contact you?
24	. А	No.
25	Q	I take it, sir, as of November 1, that year,

Now, Mr. Sonner, let me show you finally what

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A-48 Sonner-cross 103 ... This was a couple of days after my last conversationwith Mr. Iaconett: so I would say about October 28, 29. Do you know what Mr. Bartley's function was in your plant? He was to become our new Quality Control Inspector. He replaced Mr. Iaconetti? He did. Now, you testified on direct examination that you waited a week after your last conversation with Mr. Iaconetti and you telephoned Mr. Kraft to report the matter of Mr. Iaconetti, is that correct? I did not say that. A Tell me what you did within a week after --Q withdrawn. When did you first call Mr. Kraft after your last conversation with Mr. Iaconetti? I didn't call him. He came to see me. Was his visit a surprise to you? Q No.

Did you arrange an appointment with him?

You had a conversation with him at the time he

Sonner-cross

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Mr. Iaconetti that took place in your office, there was only the two of you?

- A That is correct.
- Q At no time was there ever any member of your firm present?
 - A Not at these conversations.
- Do you know whether or not Mr. Iaconetti had any conversations relative to the contract with any other members of your firm?
 - A (No response.)
- Q Subsequent to the completion of his plant facility report?
- A He may have had some conversations with other people in the plant, yes.
 - Q Do you know if he had?
- 17 A Not really, no.
 - Q Now, when did you first start producing the items under the contract?
 - A Approximately the end of January.
- 21 Q And in this contract the items are to be 22 inspected at the source?
 - A Yes.
- Q At the time, Mr. Iaconetti had no official capacity as a Quality Control Inspector in your plant, is

1	Sonner-cross 109
2	that right?
3	A That is right.
4	Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Iaconetti was
5	out on sick-leave during October 1974?
6	A I don't know that he was out but I know what he
7	me. He told me that he was going into the hospital for an
8	operation on, I believe, a slipped disc.
9	Q Do you know whether or not he had that operation
10	A No, I don't.
11	Q Did Mr. Iaconetti at any time threaten you with
12	the loss of that contract?
13	A No, he didn't threaten me.
14	Q Did he ever say to you specifically that unless
15	you gave him money, you would lose the contract?
16	A No, he didn't state that specifically.
17	Q You testified you had a feeling you would lose
18	the contract, is that correct?
19	A Yes.
20	Q But there was nothreat made to you by
21	Mr. Iaconetti relative to that?
22	A That is correct.
23	Q You testified that there were some difficulties
24	relative to the production samples. What did that entail,
25	Mr. Sonner?

	EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPTPORTIONS OF TESTIMONY OF ZENON BABIUK
1	Babiuk-direct 150
2	It is what the defendant did that counts, not
3	what this witness' impressions were.
4	MR. DEARIE: Thank you.
5	Would you read the last question and answer.
6	(Whereupon, the last question and answer were
7	read by the reporter.)
8	MR. DEARIE: Would that complete your answer?
9	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10	Q Now, sir, finally may I ask you if there ever
11	came a time in the conversations you described here this
12	morning where Mr. Iaconetti asked you for any sum of money
13	or anything specific?
14	A No, sir. He never did.
15	MR. DEARIE: I have nothing further, your Honor.
16	CROSS-EXAMINATION
17	BY MR. DICKER:
18	Q Mr. Babiuk, you testified Mr. Iaconetti never
19	asked you for any money?
20	A No. Mr. Iaconetti never asked me.
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22	Did he ever tell you that unless you gave him something, you would not get the contract?
23	A No, sir, he never did.
24	
25	any way?
21)	A Threaten how?

1	Babiuk - Cross/Dicker 163
2	the contract?
23	A The contracting officer will either telephone
4	us or send us a letter informing us that we have been awarded
5	the contract.
6	Q And you were awarded this contract?
7	A fes.
8	Q And have you performed under that particular
9	contract?
10	A Yes; we have.
11	Q Now, at present is that contract concluded?
12	A Yes, it is.
13	
14	Q And do you have another government contract? A fes.
15	
16	paratical another
לו	A The amount is undetermined, it depends upon the
18	requirements of various agencies, no dollar amount was set;
19	one can estimate it is a couple of hundred thousand dollars.
20	Q Now, when the bid was submitted by Champion
21	Envelope, did you actually know did you know whether or
22	not the inspection of your products would be set at source
	or set at destination?
23	A Well, they were for the past several years at
24	the source.
25	Q How about this particular contract that we

The manufacture of envelopes under contract

And do you know, sir, the approximate amount of

The approximate of the contract was \$1,210,000.

Now, I take it, sir, in connection with the

contract there came a time when a pre-award survey was

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upon which we bid.

that contract?

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Q Mr. Lioi, I take it that prior to this conversation you did have some contact with the defendant; is that correct?

Lioi - Direct

A fes, on one occasion approximately ten to twelve months before that, at least it was during the prior year, on one occasion Mr. Iaconetti came to Champion Envelope for another pre-award survey of a much smaller contract that we do won, and I was involved with him briefly at that time during one morning.

Q Do recall perhaps the dollar amount of that cc act?

The dollar amount of that contract was approximately \$40,000 to \$50,000.

Q Did there come a time then, sir, in February that you had the occasion to meet with Mr. Iaconetti?

A Yes, that Monday morning, February 10th, Mr. Iaconetti came into the office.

Q Did you have a discussion with Mr. Iaconetti at that time?

A fes.

Q I ask you first of all, Mr. Lioi, was anybody else present during this discussion?

A No one else was present.

Q And where specifically do you recall did that

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Lioi-cross/Dicker

- Therefore, sir, you were sure your company could perform under the contract if it was awarded to you, is that correct?
 - A That is correct.
- Now, on February 10, when Mr. Iaconetti first appeared at the office, did you know his full name?
- A I knew the name Harry Iaconetti. I don't think I knew his middle initial at that time.
- ? When he said to you that this is a big contract or words to that effect, it would be tough to justify, what did you say to him?
- A I said that I thought that -- I was sure that we could satisfy any of the requirements they might have, meaning GSA, in the pre-award survey, and he indicated again a couple of times, repeating, this is really a big one.
- Q Isn't it a fact, Mr. Lioi, that it is a big contract, the biggest one your company ever had?
- A It is the largest single government contract we ever had, yes.
- 2 And Mr. Iaconetti came there fro the General Services administration, isn't that so?
 - A Yes.
- 2 So he was only talking to you about the government bid and not about your commercial business?

satisfy GSA requirements. What are the problems?"

And this was a question of mine that wasn't

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1	Lioi-cross/Dicker 224
2	A May I go back again?
3	Q Yes or no, please, sir.
4	THE COURT: No, the question may be misleading.
5	MR. DICKER: I don't want any misleading
6	questions.
7	A How was that, again?
8	Q Page 21, you described envelopes being a
9	lowly product and what you meant by that, did you explain that
10	to Mr. Iaconetti, is my question?
11	A No, I did not explain or define in the
12	conversation what I meant by a lowly product.
13	Q Mr. Lioi, after Mr. Iaconetti left your
14	office late in the afternoon of February 11th, did you
15	telephone him on the 12th?
16	A No, I did not telephone him on the 12th.
17	Wait. Can The 12th would be the following day, Wednesday
18	Q Yes.
19	A No, I did not.
20	Q Did you speak to Mr. Iaconetti on the 13th
21 .	or 14th?
22	A It was one of those days, to the best of
23	my recollection, that Mr. Iaconetti called me. I mentioned
24	this earlier. The first call to me after our Tuesday
25	meeting in my office, and just asked me had anyone from the

contract?

1	Lioi-cross
2	A I am not aware of the procedures within the
3	GSA after the pre-award survey is conducted, no.
4	Q Again, Mr. Lioi, do you recall testifying on
5	March 11, 1975 before a grand jury?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Page 8.
8	I refer you to your statement commencing on
9	Line 18:
10	"So this pre-award survey audit is conducted
11	before the contract is actually awarded. Once that
12	is conducted, if you meet with all of the require-
13	ments, then a favorable report is rendered. Then yo
14	will actually receive an award of a contract. Now
15	it is officially yours."
16	A Yes.
17	Q So that you knew then what happens after a
18	pre-award survey is submitted by the GSA inspector?
19	A No. In answer to your earlier question, it i

A No. In answer to your earlier question, it is still no. I don't know what happens in the GSA. I know once I get the award, once a favorable report is rendered,

if they approve it.

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Q If the report is favorable then the company is awarded the contract?

A That is the end product. That is so.

Lioi-cross

2	Q	Did anyone assist you when you took the tape
3	out of the mad	chine?
4	A	Yes. One of my two associates was in the
5	room with me.	
6	Q	What did you then do with the tape?
7	A	I rewound the tape to the beginning. That's
8	what I did, I	rewound it to the beginning.
9	Q	Was this the first time you used that voice
10	activated rec	order?
11	A	I had never recorded a conversation in my
12	office before	that conversation, no.
13	Q	Did you ever rewind tape on that machine?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	How many times?
16	A	I couldn't say.
17	Q	What did you do with the tape after you
18	rewound it?	
19	A	I listened to the tape myself from beginning
20	to end.	
21	. 0	Anybody else with you when you listened?
22	A	Yes, my two associates.
23	Q	You played the tape again?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	How many times?

1 Lici-cross A 2 Once. Only that once. Did you rewind it after you played it again? Q 3 A Yes. Then what did you do with the tape? Q 5 I turned the tape over to --6 What did you do with the tape after you 7 replayed it and rewound it? 8 Nothing. Physically? A 9 Yes. 10 Nothing. 11 Did you leave it on your desk? . Q 12 A No. 13 Where did you put it? Q 14 I locked it in a credenza in my office. A 15 Did you place it in an envelope or leave the Q 16 tape on the reel? 17 The tape remained in the machine in its 18 rewound position located in my credenza. 19 When did you next see the tape? 20 It was either the following day or the day 21 after when I next saw the tape. 22 Did you at that time turn the tape over to 23 anyone else? 24 Yes. 25

1	7 Lioi - Cross/Dicker 253
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3	Q On the 10th, did Mr. Iaconetti come back to
4	your office after lunch?
5	A Previously, yes.
6	Q Was the voice activator recorder on them?
7	A I am not certain whether it was on when he
8	came back into my office after lunch.
9	Q Didn't you set it up after he left your office
10	on the morning of the 10th?
11	A Let me correct
12	Q Did you did you not
13	THE COURT: Excuse me. The witness is to be
14	allowed to correct an answer.
15	A The response to your previous question is no, it
16	was not on. It was in my desk. I had placed it in my desk
17	because it was not in the "on" position.
18	Q You knew that Mr. Iaconetti was still in the
19	office after you had placed it in your desk and it was in the
20	"on" position as you say?
21	A It was not in the "on" position.
22	Q I'm sorry.
23	But it was in the "on" position on February 11th?
24	A That is correct.
25	Q Now, when did Mr. Iaconetti leave the office on

A-67 EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT--PORTIONS OF TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY PIONZIO Pionzio - direct 366 1 Relative to the bidder? Q 2 Is there a financial report required? 3 Well, can I go back and explain the procedure? Yes, please do. 5 When the Pre-Award Survey is completed to the satisfaction of the QAS, he in turn forwards it to his Super-7 visor, who reviews it for completeness, and sees that all the 8 9

areas are covered. If there are any questions that come up as a result of his review, he contacts the QAS, and they resolve these questions, and thus clarifies the report so that it is clearly affirmative or negative, and there is no doubt

in anybody's mind.

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Officer's shop, or the Procurement shop or division — Excuse my terminology — who in turn couples this with other information that he must require. Excuse my ignorance, I am not in Procurement, I know there is a certain dollar limitation that if the bid or the solicitation exceeds a certain dollar value then he must go out and get a financial report.

Okay.

When he receives our Report, and he gets a financial report, and maybe an EEO Report -- an Equal Employment Opportunities Report -- and any extraneous data he may have to have to arrive at a determination, he marries this

EXCERPTS	FROM TRIAL	TRANSCRIPTPORTIONS	OF TESTIMONY	OF
HARRY D.	IACONETTI (DEFENDANT)	×.	

Iaconetti-direc
raconetti-direc

A Yes, I did.

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- When was the first pre-award survey you made for the Champion Envelope Company?
 - A In January 1973.
- Q When was the second pre-award survey that you made?
 - A Early in 1974.
- Q In February of 1975, you made a third preaward survey?
 - A Yes.
- You were present in court and you heard Mr. Lioi say there was only one prior pre-award survey?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Was that accurate?
- A No, sir.
 - O Do you recall the amount of the bid that was involved in the first pre-award survey?
 - A Approximately eighteen thousand dollars.
 - Q In the second, not the one on February 11th --
 - A Approximately twenty-two thousand dollars.
 - O So none of those pre-award surveys that you did with the Champion Envelope Company involved anything more than twenty-two thousand dollars; is that correct?
 - A That is correct, sir.

	- 1		laconetti-direct
2	2	0	What did he say to you about that particula-
	3	matter?	
	4	A	That he and his two brothers actually
	5	originated th	ne company. And that was approximately
	6	seventeen or	eighteen years ago.
	7	Q	Did he say anything further about whether he
	8	had any inter	est in the corporation?
	9	A	Yes, he did.
	10	Q	What did he say, specifically?
	11	A	Well, mainly his ownership is what he
	12	discussed.	
	13	Q	I'm sorry?
	14	λ	His portion of ownership.
	15	O .	What did he say relative to that?
	16	λ	That he was one-third owner.
	17	Q	Now, subsequent to August or September of
	18	1970, did Mr.	Sonner ever say anything to you relative to
	19	that that would	ld indicate there had been any change?
	20	A	No.
	21	Q	Now, Mr. Iaconetti, in October of 1974, did
	22	you have occas	tion to speak to Mr. Somer malation to the

contract that he had with the Government -- with the General

Services Administration?

Yes, I did.

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specifications and your special records are not the way the standard spells it out." He said, "Well, look Harry, how about if I give you \$1,000 and just, you know, take care of those inadequacies for me." I started laughing. I thought it was a joke figuring that Mr. Lioi knows darn well that this is nothing detrimental. It certainly can be corrected easily and a sum of \$1,000 was astronomical to offer. He repeated it again.

Q What did he say to you, Mr. Iaconetti, and what did you say specifically to him?

A He said, "Look, Harry, I don't want nothing to go wrong with this contract even though it might seem trivial but I want it to be perfect so it's worth \$1,000 to me if you could just overlook these little inadequacies and take care of them for me." I told him --

Q I'm sorry --

A I told him I would, anyway. That's our job.

When a contractor is good in all other aspects certainly the record keeping and the inadequacies of the proper standards could be easily corrected without too much problem and showing him how to use the standards. It behooves me to do this.

Q Was there any further conversation relative to that, Mr. Iaconetti?

Q What happened after that?

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Well, I thought about it for the moment figuring that maybe Mr. Lici didn't realize the seriousness of it and

direction of offer.

I even joked back figuring maybe I will make him admit it was a joke or something. I says, "Well, a contract like that, \$1,000 to remove a blemish, make it two make it 20." He says, "No, one is fine, I just want to obliterate this inadequacy we have and it will be all straightened out, we will take care of it."

maybe I could discourage him completely from pursuing that

Q Did you say anything to him at that time about the plant facilities report.

A Yes, I told him that's very good. We didn't have any sweat concerning the -- the man-hour was excellent, the machinery was excellent, the capability was there, all we had evaluated that day except for the inadequacy of the federal standard and the Mill Standard 105.

Q Did you have any further discussion with him about money?

A I had asked whether he was doing this on his own or his partners -- I started to collect data and wanted to know if he was alone in the offer or his partners were part of the offer, so when the right time came, I could support this information to our office, the office of compliance of GSA.

Q Did he say anything in response to that?

A He sort of led me into further discussion and

Presently, yes. A

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Mr. Iaconetti, currently could you give us some idea as to your financial obligations? Do you have a

.				
1 2	5		Iaconetti-cross 540	,
3	home m	ortgage	?	
4		A	Yes, I do.	-
5			MR. DICKER: What time is this? You mean now	
6		Pebrua	ry, last year?	
7			MR. DEARIE: I will be more specific.	
8			MR. DICKER: Thank you.	
9		Q	Do you currently have a home mortgage?	
10		A	Yes.	
11		Q	On the East Flatbush residence?	
12		A	Yes.	
13		Q	Did you have this home mortgage February of	
14	1975?			
15		A	Yes.	
16		Q	Did you have the home mortgage in October 197	4?
17		A	Yes, sir.	
18		Q	Could you tell us the amount of that mortgage	?
19		A	It has recently been upped to \$300 a morth bu	t
20	it was	approx	imately \$270.	
21		Q	Did you maintain any other loans during the	
22	period	of Oct	ober '74 to February 1975 of any kind?	
23		A	Loans?	
24		Q	Outstandi ng loans, debts.	
25		A	Yes, when I purchased the car I took a loan	
	on the	vehicle		

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2	6 Iaconetti-cross 541
3	Q Anything further?
4	A Oh, while I was doing renovation on my home
5	I took another small loan.
6	Q Could you tell us the approximate amount of
7	your auto loan?
8	A Approximately \$5,000.
9	Q The monthly payments, if you will?
10	A I believe that was \$180 a month.
11	Q When did that auto loun terminate?
12	A I would say about five months or six months
13	ago.
14	Q In August of '75?
15	A I am not sure. I would have to look at the
16	loan payment book.
17	Q Did you have an additional loan that terminated
18	in March of 1975 for the sum of \$234?
19	A That's the home renovation.
20	Q An additional loan with the Chase Manhattan?
21	THE COURT: \$234, do you mean that is the
22	payment a month?
23	MR. DEARIE: Yes.
	Q Mr. Iaconetti, did you have occasion to have a
24	loan involving a \$232 monthly payment with the Chase Manhatta
25	Bank that terminated in April of 1975?

1	7 Iaconetti-cross 542
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3	A How much was that amount?
4	Q Approximately \$232.77.
5	A That was the loan we are speaking of now.
6	Q Yes.
7	A One loan, fine, yes, sir.
8	THE COURT: I am confused.
	THE WITNESS: So am I.
9	MR. DEARIE: May I start again?
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11 12	Q Mr. Iaconetti, you told us you had a loan for
13	\$180 for your car?
14	A Yes.
15	Q I think you told us that loan terminated several
16	months back?
17	A Yes.
	Q I think you told us you had a second loan in-
18	volving \$234 a month payment to the Pranklin National Bank
19	that ended in March of 1975 for your house?
20	A Yes, the home loan.
21	Q Thirdly, did you just tell us that now you had
22	an additional loan with the Chase Manhattan Bank ending
23	April 1975 involving a monthly payment of \$232.77?
24	A I believe that is so, yes.
25	Q That is the third loan, is that correct?

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(2:30 pm)

JB#3pm

THE COURT: All right, bring in the jury, please.

(The jury enters the jury box.)

THE COURT: Whose ankle was injured?

JUROR NO. 6: My knee, sir.

THE COURT: Do you feel all right?

JUROR NO. 6: I think I can go through with it. I can go through with it.

THE COURT: You may have to come back tomorrow. I don't want you to rush or do anything that would jeopardize anybody's rights.

Do you understand that?

JUROR NO. 6: I do, sir.

THE COURT: All right. If at any time you feel uncomfortable, let me know.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am now going to instruct you with respect to the law of the case and I want you to follow my instructions. You will decide the facts.

Nothing I have said or done should suggest to you in any way my view of the facts or my view of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. My sole function here is to see that you decide the case fairly, and you assume that I have no view with

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respect to guilt or innocence.

There are a number of instances in which

I ruled on objections. The objections were properly
made, and you are not to take any actions of any of
the attorneys as bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. Again, they were doing their job
and nothing that they said or did bears on the evidence before you, except insofar as they helped you
analyze that evidence.

You are not to be considering any material that was stricken or any answers that I did not allow to be given. If I sustained an objection, you are not to consider the question. It is the answer that counts.

The fact that this was a prosecution brought in the name of the United States is not entitled to any weight at all. The Government and the defendant are equal in this court. No party is entitled to any sympathy or favor.

The indictment is an accusation in writing, and it is not evidence of guilt. It is just a way of bringing a case into court, as I explained to you at the outset.

This defendant has pled not guilty to all of

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the counts. He is presumed to be innocent of all of those counts, and that presumption of innocence remains with him throughout the trial and into your deliberations and should be considered by you when you deliberate.

The Government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element of the crime the defendant is charged with committing, and you will have to consider every element in connection with each of the five crimes.

A defendant does not have to prove himself innocent, nor does he have to submit any evidence, because he is presumed to be innocent. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt lies on the Government and continues throughout the trial.

A reasonable doubt means a doubt sufficient to cause a prudent person to hesitate to act in the most important affairs of his or her life.

Finding a citizen to be guilty of a felony and subjecting him to the possibility of criminal penalties is serious, and you will consider this fact in deciding whether you have a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless, if you are convinced beyond a reasonable

Charge

doubt of the defendant's guilt, you should find him guilty and not be swayed by any consideration of sympathy.

In evaluating the evidence, you are going to have to rely upon your own common sense and general experience in this case.

This defendant is charged with committing five separate crimes arising from the alleged solicitations of bribes from two corporations in 1974 and 1975. Each alleged crime or count and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately by you, and a separate verdict should be returned as to each count, but of course you are free and you should consider the evidence with respect to one of the events in considering whether the evidence with respect to the other event is credible. That is, all the evidence in the case can be considered with respect to each of the five counts.

I am going to read now from the indictment.

Count One, which charges the defendant with soliciting a bribe from Champion Envelope Manufacturing

Company, reads as follows:

"Count One. On or about the 10th day of February, 1975 and the 11th day of February, 1975,

both dates being approximate and inclusive, within
the Bastern District of New York, the defendant
Harry Dominick Iaconetti, being a public official
as defined in Section 201(a), Title 18, United States
Code, did knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, directly
and corruptly ask and solicit from Champion Envelope
Manufacturing Company, Inc. approximately \$9,500 for
himself in return for the defendant Harry Dominick
Iaconetti's being influenced in the performance of
his official acts."

Now, the exact date and the exact amounts involved are not critical. They are approximations.

Count Four is exactly the same except that it is alleged that the defendant solicited an unspecified amount of money from Lightalarms Electronics Corporation in 1974.

The provision of the law regarding soliciting a bribe is Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 201(c), which provides in relevant part that,

"Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any

other person or entity, in return for being influenced in his performance of his duty in connection with any official act shall be guilty of a felony.

The statute defines a public official as follows: "an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof.... in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency or branch of Government."

You may find that a quality assurance specialist of the General Services Administration is a public official.

This statute defines "official act" as follows: "...any decision or action on any question matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in his capacity, or in his place of trust or profit."

You may find that a quality assurance specialist executing a plant facilities report or inspection or activity in connection with that is doing an official act.

There are three essential elements required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt this offense of

solicitation of a bribe. First, the act of soliciting anything of value by a public official, as charge in the indictment. Here you would have to find that the defendant solicited money from the witness Lioi or from the witness Sonner.

You may find that the defendant was acting as a public official conducting official activities

Second, the doing of such an act willfully and corruptly; and

when he evaluated these two businesses for the

purpose of awarding government contracts.

Third, the doing of such act with the intent on the part of the public official that the requested payment be in return for being influenced in his performance of any official act.

To answer those second and third points, you have to determine what was in the defendant's mind and what motivated his conduct at the times in question.

An act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with a bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law with respect to bribery.

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To act corruptly is ordinarily to act with
the hope or expectation of either financial gain or
other benefit to oneself, or some aid or profit or
benefit to another. So a person acts corruptly
whenever he willfully solicits money or anything of
value to be influenced in his official action as a
public official. It does not matter that the person
soliciting the bribe intends to turn over all or part
of it to another person or persons.

To act with an intent to influence means to act with the specific intent to affect or to have an effect on conduct or actions. In considering this element you are called upon to determine again what was in the defendant's mind and the purpose which motivated him in his conduct.

Although the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any request for money, if it was made, was made with the understanding of the defendant that it was meant to influence an official act of his as a public official himself and acting with others, it is not an element of the crime, and the Government need not prove that the defendant or anyone else was in fact influenced or that he or anybody else changed or altered his actions in any

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way, or that any service was in fact performed in connection with these events that otherwise would not have been performed in a perfectly legal and acceptable way.

The Government need only prove that something of value was solicited or received in return for, and for the purpose of, and with the intent of, being influenced in an official act, and, as I say, it makes no difference whether the acts intended to be influenced were in fact influenced, or that the object of the bribe could not be obtained or was not obtained, or that if the act were done it turned out that there had been actually no need or occasion to seek to influence any official conduct. It is the corrupt solicitation or receiving of money with intent to be influenced in an official act that constitutes the offense.

Moreover, in considering the guilt or innocence of a defendant who is accused of bribery, it makes no difference that the object of the bribe is itself lawful activity. That is, that the company was not doing anything wrong or the Government would have gotten good value for its money, in any event. The purpose of the law is to protect the integrity of

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official acts against the possible temptation to act in other than a proper manner which may result from the payment of money to influence such an official act.

Count Two charges the defendant with receiving a bribe from Champion, and I will read it to you also, as follows:

"Count Two. On or about the 24th day of
February, 1975, within the Eastern District of New
York, the defendant Harry Dominich Iaconetti, being
a public official as defined...did knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, directly and corruptly accept
and receive from Champion Envelope Manufacturing
Company approximately \$3,000 for himself in return
for the defendant Harry Dominick Iaconetti's being
influenced in the performance of his official acts."

The same statutory section. I read to you in connection with Counts One and Four is the basis for this felony charge in Count Two. So what I have said to you about who a public official is and what an official act is, as defined in that count, applies to this Count 2 as well. Here, too, there are three essential elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish the offense

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of receiving a bribe in violation of the law.

Pirst, the act of receiving anything of value by a public official, as charged in the indictment, and here you would have to find that the defendant took money from Mr. Lioi.

exercised voluntary control over it. It is not necessary that he actually touch it or put it in his pocket or that he spend it or put it in the bank or anything like that. If he directed someone to put it in his car and it was placed there at a time when he intended it to be placed there, so that he could control it and use it for his own personal benefit or the benefit of another person and not with the purpose of turning it over as evidence, you may find that he was acting as a public official doing official work at this time.

The second and third elements are identical to those already covered in connection with the first count.

Second, that he was doing the act willfully and corruptly.

And third, that he was doing the act with the

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intent on his part that the payment be in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act.

"Willfully," "corruptly," and "intent to influence an official act" have all been defined, and their definitions remain the same. Again, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that Champion received any benefit from any of the alleged payments or that they would have received any benefits from Mr. Iaconetti. It does not make any difference whether Mr. Iaconetti would have himself kept that money or given it to a co-conspirator. one of the higher-ups, if there were any such people. It doesn't make any difference. If, however, his intention was to turn that money over as evidence to an official as he testified, then he couldn't be guilty of this crime. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, as I say, on the Government.

Count Three is an extortion count. It charges the defendant with attempting to extort money from Champion, and it reads as follows:

"From on or about the 10th day of February, 1975 up to and including the 24th day of February, 1975, both dates being approximate and inclusive,

defendant Harry Dominick Iaconetti did unlawfully,

willfully and knowingly attempt to obstruct, delay

within the Eastern District of New York, the

 and affect commerce, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by attempting extortion, as that term is defined in the Code, in that the defendant Harry Dominick Iaconetti attempted to obtain a sum of money not due him or his office from and with the consent of Champion Envelope Manufacturing Company, Inc., such consent to be induced under color of official right and by fear of economic loss."

Count Five is exactly the same except it refers to an attempt to extort money from Lightalarms in 1974. Now, the particular section involved is Section 1951 of Title 18, and it reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by extortion or attempts or conspires so to do"...shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

And it defines the term "extortion" to mean

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"the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of...fear, or under color of official right."

And the term "commerce" means all commerce between any point in the state...and any point outside of that state.

Here, too, there have to be three essential elements established beyond a reasonable doubt to prove extortion:

First, that the defendant attempted to induce his victime to part with property, attempted to get money from them;

Second, that he did so by attempting "extortion" as I shall define this word to you in these instructions; and

Third, that if he had succeeded in extorting property from his victims, interstate commerce would have been delayed, interrupted, or adversely affected.

The first element of the offense is that the defendant attempted to obtain sums of money from Champion and Lightalarms. When the Government has charged a defendant with attempting to obtain the property of another by means of extortion, it is not

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necessary for the Government to show that the person who attempted the act would have derived any direct benefit himself. "Extortion," as defined by the statute prohibits the taking of the property of another either for one's own benefit or for the benefit of someone else.

The second required element is that the defendant must have tried to induce his victims to part with their property by means of extortion. The term extortion has a precise legal meaning, which is defined in the statute, and I am going to read it again. The term "ext rtion" means "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of fear, or under color of official right."

The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced either by wrongful use of fear or under color of official right. The term "fear" as used in the statute has the commonly accepted meaning. It is a state of anxious concern, alarm, apprehension or the like, of anticipated harm to a business or of a threatened loss to a business. That is, fear of economic loss is included. Extortion under color

of official right is the wrongful taking by a public officer of money not due him or his office.

If a victim reasonably feels compelled to pay money to a law enforcement officer, because of that officer's wrongful use of his official position for the purpose of obtaining money, the requirements of the clime of extortion under color of official right are satisfied. It is not necessary for conviction for the Government to show that the defendant had the power to withhold a contract or prevent the shipment of goods. The issue is not whether the defendant had the power to do any narm to these companies, it is whether it was reasonable for the alleged victims to have had that belief and to have acted because of fear of economic harm induced by the defendant.

You will note that extortion as defined by federal law is committed when property is obtained by consent of the victim by wrongful use of fear, or when it is obtained under color of official right, and in either instance the offense of extortion is committed.

The third and final element which you must determine is that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that if successful, interstate

Charge

commerce would have been delayed or adversely affected in any way or degree, even to a minimate degree.

You must then find that the acts of defendant would have affected such commerce. No conscious purpose of obstructing interstate commerce need be shown. It is only necessary to show a plan of extortionate behavior which is likely to have the natural effect of obstructing commerce.

No major disruption, obstruction or adverse, effect is required. Interstate commerce does not actually have to be reduced; it is enough if business might be shifted from one envelope manufacturer to another or from one security light manufacturer to another.

Interstate commerce may also be adversely affected if by an increase in the cost of doing business in interstate commerce, or by the reduction of the profits 'rom interstate business there is an adverse effect on companies or a company which deals in interstate commerce.

There was testimony, as you recall, that
Champion had suppliers all over the country and was
soliciting business in other parts of the country.

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and there was also Lightalarms evidence of the same kind. There was also testimony that GSA bought for federal installations all over the country. If you believed these witnesses when they testified, you may find that interference with the proposed government contracts here involved would have adversely affected interstate commerce. So much for the law defining those five offenses.

Obviously, having sat here for a number of days, you realize that the difficult aspect of your' work is to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and in weighing their testimony you may consider their relationship to the Government or to the defendant, the witnesses' bias or interest in the outcome of the case, the manner he or she-- Well, did we have any female witnesses? I don't think we did.

MR. DICKER: No, sir.

THE COURT: I don't think we did in this case.

The manner in which he testified, his candor and intelligence as you observed it of the witness, whether he has been corroborated by other evidence, the documents or the tapes or transcript, whether contradicted by that evidence, whether there has been

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 a change of testimony under cross-examination or from time to time during the course of events.

If you believe that a witness has willfully sworn falsely you may disregard his testimony completely, but you may accept part of it because witnesses may be mistaken in part and accurate in other parts.

The defendant testified that he did not take any money and that he at all times acted properly without being influenced by the witnesses. He has an interest in his own acquittal and his testimony must be scrutinized, or should be scrutinized with that fact in mind.

You are not to give any greater weight or credibility to the testimony of the federal GSA official or officials here who testified, or to any other official because of his official position. The testimony of every witness is to be evaluated without respect to position, and based upon what y see and hear and know about how people act generally.

A government and a defense witness testified as experts about the procedures for evaluating corporations with respect to the awarding of government contracts. They also were expert witnesses, or you may so find that they had information that you other-

Charge

wise would not have had. They did know this special field, of course, and you should consider their conclusions and opinions and give them the weight that you think they are entitled to.

The number of witnesses or documents or other exhibits is not, of course, conclusive. It is the quality that counts in your evaluation.

If you wish to have any of the testimony repeated, please send in a note, and we will try to find it, but try to be precise, because obviously 'we don't want to read everything back again. If you have real need for it, of course we will be happy to try to find it for you.

If you want the tapes played, we will do that, and any of the documents that have been marked in evidence, you may call for, and we will sand them in to you, all or any of them that you would like to see.

You are entitled, each of you, to your own opinion, but you should exchange views with each other carefully and considerately. While you should not hesitate to change your opinion if you are convinced that another opinion is correct, remember your decision must be your own.

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Any verdict must be unanimous with respect to each count. You should take up the counts one by one. You can bring in a verdict on all five at the same time or one at a time, whichever you prefer.

If you want any further help on any legal issue, by all means you come in, through a note, and we will try to give you some help.

Your oath sums up your duty, and that is, without fear or favor to any man, you will well and tryly try the issues before these parties according to the evidence given to you in court and according to the laws of the United States.

Now, if the counsel will come to the side bar and discuss the charge.

(Continued on the next page)

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(The following took place at the side bar.)

MR. DICKER: Your Honor, I would like to renew the objections and the exceptions I noted when we had the two conferences heretofore relative to the charges.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DICKER: I don't think I have to repeat all of those.

THE COURT: No.

MR. DICKER: And that includes the omissions of some of my request to charge as well.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DICKER: And I also heard your Honor add some additional matters that we hadn't gone over with before in the definition of some of the crimes.

THE COURT: Well, you better point them out to me, because if I misspoke I will correct it now.

But I'm certainly not going to take that kind of a general exception.

MR. DICKER: 111 right. Well then, may I also renew my exception to the definition of "taking," as your Honor has on Page 8.

And as to your Honor's remarks, what is required for conviction on Page 13, as well as the -- rewell as the last two sentences on Page 13, which I have may

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THE COURT: I can say on that point that I have read your memorandum, which I got this morning, I haven't had a chance to read the cases, but I don't believe you are right that bribery necessarily excludes fear, because I think inherent in a bribe is the fear that if you don't pay the bribe you are going to get hurt. That's what makes bribing attractive to people. So I don't believe that the concept that you put forth in your brief, admirable as it is and as well stated as it is, that you cannot have coercion and that under bribery it has to be completely voluntary on both sides, which is accurate, but I am going to look into it further.

MR. DICKER: The last point --

THE COURT: I --

MR. DICKER: On that -- may I continue?

THE COURT: I was just going to say that I would like very much to have from the Government some cases in which there has been a charge of both bribery and extortion in similar situations and particularly where it has been upheld on appeal.

MR. DEARIE: Has your Honor had an opportunity to review our brief on this question?

THE COURT: I have just looked at it, are those all the cases there are, are there no other explicit

cases where both are charged?

MR. DEARIE: The vast majority of cases arrive out of situations dealing with the question of exclusivity and deal with a situation where the payer of the fund is a man being charged with extortion. His defense, of course, is that it was a bribe.

Now, the closest we come of New Jersey cases.

I will be happy in view of our appointment this afternoon to discuss the charge and go further and see --

THE COURT: I would like to see a couple of Court of Appeals cases, if you have them, wherein the same indictment you charged both extortion and brinery in situations analgous to those we have.

I am going to give you a proposal charge which you can pick up this afternoon if you would like, it is being xeroxed --

MR. DICKER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: (Continuing) and which includes all the counts, but I am not sure that I am going to let both the extortion and bribery counts go to the jury.

I don't myself think that there is any harm in letting all of them go to the jury. Certainly it is all one transaction, and I couldn't sentence consecutively on the extortion and bribery counts with respect to the same transaction.

In that respect it is much like the bank robbery cases where you have a count with a weapon and a count without a weapon.

So we can consider it, but I must say I am somewhat troubled by it.

There is one thing that I just don't feel, and that is that the Hobbs Act was intended to cover this situation.

MR. DICKER: That was what I was going to get around to.

THE COURT: If you think it does as it is written and that it is broad enough to include this --

MR. DICKER: It is broad enough to include it but there was a recent determination, the Trotter case and one more which appears to be a limitation to that, and the purpose or the spirit and the intent of 1951 is really a racketeering one in which you are involved either with labor racketeering or usury, loan sharking, and in that particular aspect —

THE COURT: Well, there is that particular aspect to this case, too, which may bring the extortion statute particularly to bear on it, and that is the continued statement of the defendant that he is taking it for scaebody else and he is fearful about what somebody else is going to do, which has the odor of a group

extorting money.

MR. DICKER: Well, the elements, well, it is not an exploding bomb to permeate the area so that it can really qualify under that. But to get back to the exclusivity between the bribery and the extortion situation, the very nature of those crimes presupposes a situation where somebody is bribing, he is doing on a voluntary basis, but where you are being extorted, you are doing it on an involuntary basis.

THE COURT: If that is the theory, then I am going to allow both of them to go to the jury because

MR. DICKER: That is only a part of it.

THE COURT: (continuing) because if I just allow the bribery then you say he doesn't do it voluntarily and he was coerced and then the Government is out, whereas if I just allow the extortion then you argue it is voluntarily and not coercion and then the Government is out under those circumstances, and here is a situation, here you have the same factual situation and the evidence is amenable to an inference of either coercion or a voluntary act. So it seems to me only fair to allow the Government to go to the jury on both.

MR. DICKER: Except, your Honor, as I pointed out in the memorandum, it isn't the question that we

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are using the facts in an uncharged crime as a defense
to a charged crime, which is what your Honor may have
intimated just now. The point is --

THE COURT: Not a defense, I am just saying that if I give the jury the bribery then you can argue that the Government hasn't proven beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntary nature and you say maybe it was coercion but it wasn't voluntary, so don't find him guilty of bribery. On the other hand if it is just occarcion, then you say, Well, it wasn't coercion because there is a reasonable doubt as to whether it was voluntary and therefore you shouldn't find him guilty.

I don't think it is reasonable to do that where a jury may be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of either one or the other.

(Continued on next page.)

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MR. DICKER: In the case cited by the Government in its memorandum, in nearly all of those cases as we mentioned, there are not similar counts in the indictment as this.

THE COURT: That is the problem I have and I would like very much for the Government to supply me with something closer to this, if it exists.

MR. DEARIE: There is one interesting case I did mention, it is in the Second Circuit but the name escapes me, it is in our memorandum, it dealt directly with the more powerful argument where somebody is accused of bribery and the defense is extortion by the person who paid the money, and the Second Circuit didn't go so far as to say it is exclusive but that at the very, very most, the evidence would go solely to his intent, the state of mind and it would not be a defense —

THE COURT: Yes, there the person paying.

MR. DEARIE: That is a considerably stronger situation than the one we had here.

THE COURT: I think that is so, I think that is so, I think the person paying the amount is in an entirely different position because there the defense that it was involuntary in that sense because of coercion makes it so, but to the person taking the

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bribe, what difference does it make whether he is
getting it voluntarily or getting it because he is
coerced, because whenever there is a request for a
bribe, it is also under the implied threat that if you
don't give it to me you will be in trouble.

MR. DICKER: Well, if your Honor pleases, then there is no need to have Section 1951, which deals with the threat of violence resulting in economic loss, and that is involved and that could affect the purpose of that section.

We feel that the Government either has the bribery or the extortion count, they can't have both.

THE COURT: It is a troublesome issue and I feel that I am going to have to study it overnight.

Now, I have a draft of the charge with all of the counts and I will ask if you come up with any further cases on it, then I will be happy to have them, you can call them into my law clerk.

If the defendant can find any cases in which they dismissed one of these counts where both are charged, I would like that, if you find it.

MR. DICKER: I didn't find anything specifically on this particular point, the closest case we have is United States against Kabochi, which I have cited on page 8 and where the defendants were charged with

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extortion, and in that particular case the people who
paid the money were willing participants and could
hardly be called victims, and there the Circuit Court
said, Well, they went on to say that the Court
determined that the evidence presented to it was
characteristic of bribery and not extortion and thereupon, a direised the extortion counts against the
recipients or the defendants

Now, in the Government's cases cited in its memorandum, they are trying to show that bribery, when you add the element of fear, then ipso facto it becomes extortion.

Well, it is not so, it is a completely different crime with different elements involved in it.

THE COURT: There is considerable overlap

between the two, and that is the question. I don't

believe that they are distinct, there is a very substantial area where both apply. I think that that is the

difficulty.

All right, anything further?

MR. DICKER: No.

THE COURT: All defendant's motions are denied.

Are you prepared to go forward?

MR. DICKER: At 2:30 tomorrow, yes, your Honor.

I have two witnesses, and not including

THE COURT: Is there anything further you want to say about the extortion-bribery point? I heard full argument on it yesterday. I looked over the main cases.

MR. DEARIE: Well, your Honor, again after we broke yesterday afternoon I took another look in the hopes of finding something and with the exceptions of the cases cited, Kenny and so forth, which I believe is significant in the sense of what the case does not say as opposed to what it might specifically say, as you are aware Kenny involves two conspiracies, Hobbs Act violation, and bribery counts and the Court saw fit to address itself to it.

We have authority in the Second Circuit to the effect that the Second Circuit does not accept or buy the mutual e-clusivity doctrine.

I for one thing for a brief moment thought we were in agreement with these two crimes, that they were not mutually exclusive as presented to the Court for the evidence in the case.

I don't think there is anything necessary further that I should say except because they are not mutually exclusive I think we fall back to the basic rule. Each crime requires roof, they are separate offenses and should be forwarded to the

jury. I would ask you to submit all five counts for the jury's consideration.

MR. DICKER: The only thing I will say on that is when we left yesterday I thought your Honor had asked Mr. Dearie to come up with any other cases that he might have relative to the situation and it's obvious he hasn't. As we say in our brief, nearly all of them just don't have the two coun's. We also point out the basic reason and the differences between the crimes and we don't have a situation where if the extortion is out he can say it's extertion and not bribery. It's clear by virtue of the fact there is no authority that the Government cannot come up with any. We submit the authority shows that the Government must choose either the bribery or extortion count because they are mutually exclusive.

MR. DEARIE: There is ample authority, no specific case directly on point, but United States against Barash, United STates against Kahn, as well as the case that goes back some time -- the name escapes me --

THE COURT: Martin?

MR. DEARIE: United States against Martin, yes, I think that is a more compelling argument. The Second Circuit has expressed the opinion that

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where a man is charged with bribery and extortion, the Second Circuit as Judge Motley's decision says, that might have some bearing on the intent or the mental capacity of the party accused.

There is certain authority for the basic proposition that these two offenses as the evidence has shown here before your Honor in this instance are by no means exclusive.

I'm going to allow all five counts to go to the jury. It's quite true that extortion in recent years particularly following the congressional hearings that led to the Hobbs Act, were connected in the public mind with racketeering, both the cases and historical roots of the doctrine indicate that it is a crime that public officials acting either singly or in combination with other officials can commit.

This is made clear beyond any doubt by the statute itself, since it applies only to public officials. The statute defines extortion as "means of obtaining property from another, with his consent ...under color of official right."

We have a very good and recent decision in this Court from Judge Neaher in United States against Trotta, 396 F Supp 755, 757, summarizing the line of

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cases that have construed the phrase "color of official right."

I take it that is not reversed?

MR. DEARIE: No, that has not as yet been reversed.

THE COURT: I will rely upon it as useful authority both beca se of its fine reasoning and the Judge who decided it.

It is clear from the decision of Judge Neaher that Mr. Iaconetti is accused of the traditional type of extortion, quoting from 757: "Recent case law leaves no doubt that the language 'under color of official right' is regarded as broad enough to include within its scope any public official or employee who wrongfully —" and wrongfully is emphasized — "uses his official position to exact a payment not due him or his office, under circumstances which can be said to affect commerce in any way or degree," citing a number of cases.

The statute permits a public official to be convicted of extortion without any proof of "force, violence, or fear." It is the office itself and the power that goes with that office and its misuse that provides the coercive force that constitutes the egrivalent of force, violence, or fear.

officials or political leaders in New Jersey that
were convicted of conspiring under the Wobbs Act
through the use of fear and under color of official
right. And they were also convicted of conspiring
to violate the Travel Act by committing bribery and
extortion under the state law.

Judge Gibbons of the Third Ci cuit in Kenny noted: "As long as each crime required proof of a fact not essential to the other, even though the charges arose from a single act or series of acts, or as here a single conspiracy, the defendants could be convicted of both." That quotation appears in the case at page 1215.

There is also the case previously averred to in our discussions, Martin against the United States, 278 F. 2nd, 913, 1922, where a Federal official was convicted of bribery and extortion.

In United States against Umans, 368 I. 2nd,
725, Second Circuit 1966, the Court held it was not
inconsistent to convict a defendant of bribery and of
aiding Government officials in receiving bribes under
18 U.S.C. Section 201 and 26 U.S.C. Section 7214(a)(2)
since one of the statutes requires proof of an extra
element. The crimes, although not bribery and
extortion, were in some sense similar and were joined.

colons.

When you examine the cases it is difficult to see they should be considered exclusive. That view, as I say, was embodied under the old New York cases but the trend has been clearly away from that line of cases as indicated very effectively by Mr. Stern.

Now Judge Stern?

MR. DEARIE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Even in New York, New York Penal Law, 200.15, has abandoned that view as indicated by the Practice Commentary by Hechtman, in McKinney's.

but in a number of them the defendant did try
unsuccessfully to defend against extortion prosecution
by claiming their actions only amounted to bribery,
United States against Barash, 505 P. 2nd 139 at 151
in the Seventh Circuit, 1974; United States against
Staszcuk, 502 F. 2nd 875, 883, Seventh Circuit 1974;
and United States against Pranno, 385 F. 2nd 387,
Seventh Circuit, 1967.

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THE COURT: There are cases involving private persons which contain similar sements about non-exclusivity, including United States against Kahn, 472 F. 2d, 272, at 278, Second Circuit 1973, saying that extortion is not a defense to a bribery charge; and United States against Kabot, 295 P. 2d, 848, 854, also a Second Circuit case, 1961, taking the same position.

Et may very well be that Mr. Iaconetti violated both the bribery and extortion statutes. It's somewhat more complicated to give both crimes to the jury but essentially we have a very simple case here, and I see no reason to further simplify it by eliminating the number of counts. I don't believe the jury is going to be confused at all. If they believe the witness for the Government, they will find him guilty. If they believe whatever his statement is, which I have not yet yeard, they will find him innocent, probably.

There has been some recent indication that the Second Circuit is going to read the extortion statute narrowly. Two cases are United States against Merolla, 935 and 059, Second Circuit, decided August 11, 1975, the slip-sheet at page 5531; and perhaps United States against Trotta, 396 P. Supp. 755, already referred to

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as a decision of this district in 1975, but they have no hearing really on the questions before us.

I don't myself believe that the Merolla case has any bearing on the case before us with respect to the interstate commerce issue which was the one in that case that the Court was reversed on. I must say that I have some doubt about whether that case was rightly decided by the Court of Appeals. I think the factual statement does not adequately indicate the interstate commerce aspect relied upon by Judge Dooling.

In the case before us we have an enormous weight of evidence with respect to the interstate character of events and the impact on interstate commerce. In the first place, the General Services Administration, the evidence shows, and the Court judicially notices, is a national organization which purchases for the United States Government in all its divisions, both in this country and alroad, purchasing hundreds of millions worth of goods from all over the world and ships them all over the world or has them shipped. Anything which interferes with its proper procurement necessarily interferes with interstate commerce. Beyond that, the two suppliers here, the evidence showed, were national organizations which

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purchased their supplies from all parts of the country and shipped to all parts of the country, both to their civilian and government purchasers.

I really can't believe that they curious opinion in Marolla has any bearing whatsoever on the case before us.

Accordingly, the motions to dismiss any or all of the counts must be denied.

Now, let's turn to the charge. I have had the opportunity to go over the Government's request to charge which the Clerk will mark as a Court Exhibit.

THE CLERK: Government's request to charge marked Court Exhibit 4.

THE COURT: Yesterday, at approximately 3 o'clock, my proposed charge was distributed to counsel and of course they had it without the benefit of the Government's request, which will be marked as a Court exhibit.

THE CLERK: Marked as Court Exhibit.

THE COURT: Counsel have had it since approximately 3 o'clock yesterday and had an opportunity to study it.

Now, addressing myself first to the Government's request --

MR. DICKER: Excuse me, I don't mean to

1	PEXTORTION 959	
	very well be a repetition of something that I except	200
2	to originally.	
3	THE COURT: Yes, of course.	
4	MR. DICKER: Other than that, I have nothing	
5	further.	
6	MR. DEARIE: I have nothing.	
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"	(End of side bar.)	
3	THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen,	
•	the clerk will give the marshal paper and pencil for	.
1	you. Retire, please and consider your verdict.	
	(Whereupon, the jury retired from the courtro	om.)
	(The following took place at the side par.)	10
3	THE COURT: Is there any objection to sending	
	in the indictment? Pive counts are difficult to kee	P
	in mind.	
	HR. DICKER: I understand that. If they requ	est
	them, then obviously that's one thing. But I would	
	rather not send them in.	
	THE COURT: Without a request?	
	MR. DICKER: Yes.	
	THE COURT: But if they do, you have no object	tion?
	MR. DICKER: Yes. If they want that, certain	- 1
	THE COURT: You know, as I was reading this,	
	it occurred to me that if they should come in with bo	n±1
	a bribery and the extortion count with a guilty verdi	

that I can't allow both of them to stand. Not for the reasons you have stated for the defendant, but because of the way they were charged.

It seems to me that the distinction really between the bribery count and the extortion count is in the fear component.

When you define the extortion, or alternatively as fear or color of official right, and you permit either one of them to support extortion, there really is no distinction between color of official right and the bribery count. They turn out to be identical except for the interstate commerce portion.

So it seems to me, if you are going to charge extortic and bribery in the same indictment in a case like this, you really have to drop from the extortion count the color of official right. And that was troublesome to me. Maybe —

MR. DEARIE: I think that I see what your Honor is saying. But I think the cases support the theory, at least, common law, the derivative of the color of official right is that the duress originates with the misuse of the office. And, of course, there you do indeed have a difference between the pure bribery situation.

In other words, by presentation of his office,

his official office and by the misuse of that office. THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEARIE: There lies the duress factor.

THE COURT: I suppose you could argue that the extortion is wrongful use of the pressure on the part of the defendant, whereas the bribery is in a sense the wrongful attempt to induce by the contractor,

MR. DEARIE: Well -

MR. DICKER: It goes one step further than that I think. I think we also mentioned when we originally discussed this thing, the difference between -- in a bribe, we have a voluntary situation. And extortion, there is a totally involuntary situation. And that gets back to the point --

THE COURT: No, it is not involuntary. Extortion is : voluntary, but induced.

MR. DICKER: Which makes it involuntary.

MR. DEARIE: No.

MR. DICKER: He's compelled to do it.

MR. DEARIE: I don't think the statute --

MR. DICKER: He's doing it voluntarily.

THE COURT: I don't think so. I think that got me off the track in the first place. I don't buy your argument. And because I couldn't see your argument, I didn't think of this other aspect.

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It's a very closed question. If they come in on both of them, I'm going to choose one or the other, whichever the Government wants, and sentence him on only one.

MR. DEARIE: I assume you will give us an opportunity to address you further because we do get back to the same point. Although it may involve the same transaction, there are elements peculiar to each separate count that we are talking about.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEARIE: I'm not talking about concurrent or consecutive. I think everybody is in agreement on that. I think the point is, are they separate offenses. I think they are. Obviously, they are not multiplicitous or duplications counts which require proof --

THE COURT: Yes, those things seem to be so. It's an interesting point.

All right. We may not get to that. They may not find him guilty on any at all or they may find him on one or two.

MR. DICKER: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very nicely tried on both sides.

MR. DICKER: Thank you.

MR. DEARIE: Thank you

(End of side bar.)

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1	COURT'S ORAL DECISION DISMISSING COUNTS 3 AND 5 IN 10 THE INDICTMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
	a great deal of anxieties and this is a lesson. I
2	don't think I'll ever forget it as long as I live.
3	THE COURT: Does the Court have anything to
4	add?
5	MR. DEARIE: No, your Honor. I don't believe
6	so.
7	The Court hand the tout
8	The Court heard the testimony, the Court heard
9	Mr. Iaconetti's testimony. The Court as I believe
10	is aware of the facts that are necessary.
11	I would ask solely that you impose a concurrent
12	sentence to preserve the jury's verdict.
13	I respectfully submit to the Court that you
	have a sufficient quantum of evidence of this
14	particular man's crime.
15	THE COURT: What about 3 and 5, it does seem
16	to me the defendant has a point. It is essentially
17	the same transaction and I can't see how you can
18	convict him on the bribery and extortion merely for
19	doing the same act. It seems to me that 3 and 5
20	ought to be dismissed. It would be reinstated, if
21	there should be a reversal and a new trial
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3	MR. DEARIE: I think to refine it, 3 as it
4	relates to 1 was is the one solicitation count
5	which opposed to 2, which stands, represents the
	actual fee of \$3,000.

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With respect to 3, 1, 5 and 4, frankly, your Honor, I think the argument can be made on both sides. I do not interpret the case, although it says in a conviction of extortion under color of an official, it does not require proof of fear. We believe that is correct.

THE COURT: I believe there was fear and I charge the jury on that issue. I think either theory would be plicable here. But, what corresponding me is the problem we have with respect to the bank robbery where you can be guilty of armed bank robbery and non-armed bank robbery for the same offense.

It seems to me that it would be unconscionable to sentence him under counts 3 and 5, it refers to the same act.

MR. DEARIE: Your Honor, I believe in the

Prints and Gordon serier case 'hat dealt with the

bank robbery, sought the whole rationale, as I

understand it, under Prince and Gordon and the purpose

of it was the enumerating of 212, it remove certain

loopholes that then existed. So, an armed bank

robbery could technically, did not commit the crime

of robbery, would not go outside the Federal

jurisdiction.

Here on the other hand we have two distinct

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interests, although it may be an argument, it can be made in the sense that the bribery solicitation and the attempted extortion under color of official acts for all intents and purposes, the facts are the same. It would have two different interests. It is the so-called general judgment that Prince and Gordon would I think hold. Sentences run concurrently. The Government would have no objection, after an appeal, to consent to an amended judgment if they should in a sense elect to find Mr. Iaconetti guilty of extortion or solicitation. We have no objection to that.

But at this point in time, pending a review by the Circuit, I would prefer that the jury verdict stand, which was based on strong evidence, which I think we all must admit in terms of fear or color of official duty, the evidence was compelling. There was fear. There was abuse of office. There is no question of sufficiency.

THE COURT: There is no problem in your mind with respect to counts 1, 2 and 4. You can sustain those on appeals.

MR. DEARIE: I have no difficulty as long as the Court agrees as apparently you do, that count 2 kind of stands by itself. There is no question of

the parallel extortion crime. There was a receipt of money. Attempting to extort. The crime is in agreement. I have no problem whatsoever.

All I am now saying is with respect to the Government's interest in going to the Circuit now as we leave the Court I think the Government is best served in preserving in the best form the jury verdict of all five counts returned on this basis, I think.

THE COURT: It seems to me I oughtn't avoid a difficult decision. I will make the decision and if I am wrong the Court of Appeals will reverse it.

The Government isn't prejudiced h cause the Court of Appeals can order me to reinstate counts 3 and 5 if I am wrong. I'm not going to dispute it on the grounds they didn't prove that you didn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt the crime, because I believe you have proved beyond a reasonable doubt every one of the counts of this indictment.

I'm denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of lack of evidence. I'm denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of mistakes in the admissions of evidence under the hearsay rule.

I will issue a memorandum to support that position shortly.

MR. DEARIE: I suggest --

THE COURT: What I would like to do is to sentence Mr. Iaconetti under counts 1, 2 and 4.

Dismiss 3 and 5 under condition that the Government may move to reinstate the verdict, should it be possible to do so after an appea.

I will also say that my sentence will be the same with 1, 2 and 4 as to 3 and 5. All are valid, whether 3 and 4 are invalid I don't know. That is if he had been convicted on any count my sentence would have been identical. The other counts would have been concurrent.

So there is no need for the Court of Appeals to send this back for resentencing because the evidence was the same and would have been the same no matter how he had been charged.

Under those terms therefore I dismiss 3 and 5 without prejudice.

This is a serious crime. The defendant has been convicted by a jury verdict and compelled to accept that jury verdict as being an accurate verdict.

MR. Iaconetti, you have the right to appeal from this judgment I am about to enter. If you are unable to pay the cost of an appeal you have the right to appeal in the forma pauperis.

COURT'S MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff,

75 CR 277

- against -

MEMORANDUM and

ORDER

HARRY DOMINICK IACONETTI,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

HONORABLE DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York

By: RAYMOND J. DEARIE, Esq.
Assistant United States Attorney
For Government

LEON DICKER, Esq. 400 Madison Avenue New York, New York For Defendant

WEINSTEIN, D. J.

The defendant, Harry D. Iaconetti, a federal government contract inspector, was found guilty by a jury of soliciting and accepting a bribe (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)) and attempting to extort money (18 U.S.C. § 1951) from two government suppliers. He moves for a new trial on the

ground that the verdict rested upon inadmissible rebuttal evidence by two government witnesses. For the reasons stated below, the court finds the evidence relevant, non-prejudicial and admissible under the hearsay rules.

I. Facts

The government's chief witness against the defendant was Mr. Lioi, an officer in a corporation seeking a government contract. Mr. Lioi testified that on February 10, 1975, the defendant told him that it would be "hard to justify" a favorable pre-award survey, a prerequisite to the awarding of a contract, unless 1% of the contract price were paid to the defendant and "upper echelons" in the government. After the defendant requested the bribe, Mr. Lioi discussed it with his partners and counsel for the corporation, contacted the FBI, and arranged for future conversations with the defendant to be secretly recorded. As a result, a significant portion of the government's case consisted of tapes of the conversations between Mr. Lioi and the defendant on February 11 and 24, of 1975.

To rebut the government's case, the defendant relied primarily on his own testimony. He denied each

government witness' version of their unrecorded conversations with him. Furthermore, he testified that instead of requesting a bribe from Mr. Lioi on February 10, he was offered an unsolicited bribe of \$1,000 by Mr. Lioi despite his repeated assurances that the contract would be awarded to the firm. He explained the tapes as recordings of conversations in which he was "leading . . . on" Mr. Lioi in order to "gather evidence".

One other explanation by the defendant of his conduct was revealed on his cross-examination by the government. Immediately after his arrest, with the money in his possession, the defendant had told the FBI that the bribery discussions with Mr. Lioi had been a joke. The defendant testified as follows:

- "Q In fact, you told the FBI, Mr.
 Isconetti, that the entire unfortunate
 incident was a practical joke, didn't
 you?
 - A I said it started out like a practical joke.
- Q You didn't tell the FBI that the whole matter was a practical joke and that you had a reputation for being a practical joker, and this was one of your practical jokes that got out of hand? Isn't that what you told the --
- A Yes, I said that to [Special Agent] Chandler I believe."

Because of the conflicting interpretations that could be given portions of the tapes, because understanding the taped discussions depends in part on what happened at the February 10th meeting, and because the defendant flatly contradicted Mr. Lioi's version of the meeting on the 10th, the government presented two rebuttal witnesses. The witnesses related Mr. Lioi's reports to them on the 10th of the defendant's statements earlier that day, thus sub-

Mr. Stern testified on direct examination as follows:

stantiating Mr. Lioi's testimony that the defendant had

business partner of Mr. Lioi, and Mr. Stern, the attorney

solicited a bribe. The witnesses were Mr. Goldman, a

for the firm.

'Mr. Lioi said that an individual from GSA had been in the factory that day and that the individual had been there for purposes of doing a pre-award survey with regard to a contract that [the firm] had bid on.

This individual had at one point in the day asked him directly for money. I believe the amount was \$12,000 [approximately 1% of the contract]. And that that money was to feather the bed and give [the firm] that contract. . . . He also said that the man offered him a deal with regard to future contracts."

Defendant made a timely objection to the testimony of these two witnesses; the ground stated was that
the testimony was prejudicial inadmissible hearsay.

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1).

II. Relevancy

Rules 401 to 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence require that evidence be relevant and that its relevance not be outweighed by unfair prejudice. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as tending to affect the probability of a proposition of fact a party must establish. It reads:

"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."

The testimony of the two rebuttal witnesses meets the relevancy test of Rule 401. It is highly probative of a material fact in the case, that is, that the defendant solicited a bribe from Mr. Lioi on February 10th, as charged in the indictment. Evidence that Mr. Lioi contacted a business partner and the attorney for the corporation shortly after his meeting with the defendant makes it

more probable that something of consequence to the business occurred during the meeting with the defendant. It would be imperative to consult with a business partner after any discussion of a bribe in order to determine how to meet what might be a business crisis. The evidence showed that loss of this contract would have adversely affected the company. Once it was decided to resist, the corporation counsel's advice would be necessary in deciding how to act.

The testimony of these two witnesses as to the content of Mr. Lioi's communication with them also had an important bearing on the jury's evaluation of witnesses' credibility. The rebuttal evidence makes it more likely that Mr. Lioi's version of the February 10th meeting with the defendant was accurate rather than the defendant's testimony that Mr. Lioi was actively seeking to bribe him. Confirmatory evidence is relevant since it aids the jury in evaluating the probative force of other evidence offered to prove a material fact. Mr. Lioi's testimony was crucial with respect to not only the events of the 10th, but also those of the days intervening to the defendant's arrest on the 24th. It set the framework for the tape recorded

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conversations and helped to explain the tone of those conversations. Thus, the rebuttal evidence is relevant as directly probative of a material fact and as a reinforcement of the credibility of a key witness.

Despite the fact that the evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in the trial court's discretion if its negative, prejudic consequences outweigh the probative value. As Rule 403 provides:

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

None of the factors listed in Rule 403 overbalances the probative force of the evidence. The prejudicial effect of the evidence was not significant. The jury had already heard that the defendant had solicited a bribe on February 10th. The emotional impact of hearing two brief confirmations of the solicitation was negligible. Furthermore, since the rebuttal testimony was restricted, by direction of the court, to repetition of the defendant's statements to Mr. Lioi, as related by Mr. Lioi to the witnesses, there was no

confusion, delay, or waste of time.

III. Hearsay

Goldman's and Stern's testimony would traditionally have been characterized as hearsay. They repeated the extra judicial declarations of Lioi relating what the defendant said to prove what defendant said. This is hearsay under Rules 801(a)(b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence reading:

"Rule 801 Definitions
The following definitions apply under
this article:

(a) Statement. A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A 'declarant' is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."

Exceptions to this rule provide four independent routes by which the rebuttal witnesses' reports of Mr. Lioi's out of court statements to them may be admitted as evidence in chief.

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A. Consistent testimony to rebut charge of fabrication

Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent statements of a witness testifying and subject to cross-examination concerning his statements are not hearsay when offered under certain circumstances to support credibility. It reads:

"(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. . . .

The rebuttal evidence meets the three conditions of Rule 801(d)(1)(E). First, the declarant, Mr. Lioi, testified at the trial and was subject to cross-examination about the February 10th meeting. Second, Mr. Goldman's and Mr. Stern's testimony was consistent with Mr. Lioi's testimony about the defendant's solicitation of a bribe. Third, the evidence rebutted an implied charge of improper motive. The defendant's account of his February 10th conversation with Mr. Lioi contradicted Mr. Lioi's account both in matters of major importance and in details. The total variance between the two accounts of the February 10th conversation is

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that Mr. Lioi lied because of improper motive. The defendant dant also expressly suggested on the witness stand that Mr. Lioi fabricated the idea of the defendant's seeking a bribe for the improper motive of covering up the fact that Mr. Lioi himself had attempted to bribe the defendant.

B. Admission of defendant

The evidence may be considered an admission by the defendant under an agency theory and therefore admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C):

"(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
A statement is not hearsay if . . .

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject. . . "

From the other evidence in the case, including the transcripts of February 11 and 24, the court finds as a predicate for admissibility pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the defendant requested a bribe from Mr. Lioi on February 10th and authorized him to confer with his associates in order to get their permission to pay that bribe. He was fully aware of the organization of the ousiness and knew

that Mr. Lioi could not make the large payment demanded without the permission of his business associates. To demand a bribe was, therefore, to authorize those who ran the business to discuss the demand. Mr. Lioi's repetition of the defendant's solicitation is, as a result, an authorized statement, an admission by a party.

C. Reliable and necessary hearsay

The Federal Rules of Evidence codify an openended exception for reliable and necessary hearsay. Its use requires careful exercise of judicial discretion and the satisfaction of precise criteria. It reads:

"Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

"However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant."

The first requirement of Rule 803(24) is that there be "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those for the enumerated hearsay exceptions. The declarant was available for cross-examination. The fact that the statement was made close on the heels of the criminal event and to persons with whom it was appropriate and even necessary to communicate would seem to m. . e the risks of insincerity and faulty memory. The quality of the facts cited as insuring reliability for the first twenty-three hearsay exceptions range over an entire spectrum. The factors present here are certainly equivalent in reliability to those of many of the other exceptions and superior to some. We prefer not to rest on the state of mind exception, Rule 803(3), even though United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919, 82 S.Ct. 240, 7 L.Ed.2d 134 (1961), in circumstances much like those before us, admitted hearsay on that theory.

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That case probably went beyond the limits of Rule 803(3) by allowing "a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed." Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106, 54 S.Ct. 22, 26, 78 L.Ed. 196, 203 (1933); United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1961).

The second requirement of the Rule is that the "statement [was] offered as evidence of a material fact."
Rule 803(24)(A). This requirement seems redundant since, if it did not tend to prove or disprove a material fact, the evidence would not be relevant and would not be admissible under Rules 401 and 402. What is probably meant is that the exception should not be used for trivial or collateral matters. The discussion of the probative value of the evidence for the purpose of meeting the requirements of Rule 401 makes it clear that the evidence is relevant to a material proposition of fact in the case and is of great importance.

Rule 803(24)(E) requires that the "statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." The testimony of the two rebuttal witnesses is the most powerful evidence of what was said in view

of the straight conflict between the chief witness for the prosecution, Mr. Liai, and the defendant, with respect to what happened on the critical date of February 10th. Furthermore, the testimony not only casts light on what was said, but also on how it was said. This is important because of the statement of the defendant to the FBI that the bribery discussion was all a joke. Thus, the meaning of the words used by the defendant on February 10, the critical date, depends to a considerable extent on body motions and whether defendant was laughing or winking, whether his tone of voice would give color and meaning to words which otherwise would be neutral. Even the words, "I don't want to take a bribe and will not take one," said with a wink and a smile might well be interpreted as mean exactly the opposite. Evidence of Mr. Lioi's response to the February 10th conversation is in the final analysis the best available to resolve doubt about what actually occurred between the defendant and Mr. Lioi.

In addition, "the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24)(C). There is a clear conflict of credibility. The jury was entitled to all the help available on the point.

Finally, the government gave the defendant ample notice of the intention to offer the statement. Notice was given midway through the defendant's testimony, five days before the rebuttal witnesses were called. Defendant did not request a continuance or make any reference to an inability to adequately prepare to meet the testimony of the new witnesses. Although notice was not given in advance of trial, as required by the language of the Rule, allowance must be made for situations like this in which the need did not become apparent until after the tri 1 had commenced. Since it was not the proponent's fault to notice could only be given after the trial began, and since the defendant was not prejudiced by the mid-trial notice, the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 803(24).

IV. Presentation on Rebuttal

The court has broad powers to control the mode and order of interrogating witnesses. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(a). Presentation on rebuttal, after the defendant had testified, rather than as part of the government's direct case, was appropriate and desirable.

V. Conclusion

The rebuttal evidence was properly admitted. It was necessary so "that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined," as required by the fundamental rule of interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 102.

The motion for a new trial is denied.

So ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York January 8, 1976

U. S. D. J.

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	- AMERICAN SAME	1913 EANIAG INVASORIATION	Marie Great	HE THE TOTAL
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COUNSEL		rever the court advised defendant of right to		
	X WITH COUNSEL L	Legn_Dicker, Esq		- 1000
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NOTICE OF APPEAL TO UNITED STATES COURT OF	APPEALS-SECOND CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	URT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ATTACANCE	
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
INTER CENTER	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
Docket No	75-CR-277
Plaintiff,	
vJa	ck B. Weinstein
	(District Court Judge)
HARRY D. IACONETTI,	· .
Defendant.	
NOTICE OF APPEAL	
Notice is hereby given that Harry D. Taconet	++
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the	appeals to
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(specify) and conviction entered in this action on	January 7, 1976
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	(Counsel for Appellant) LEON DICKER
Date January 8, 1976 Address 400 Ma	adison Avenue
To: Appeals Clerk New Yo	ork, N. Y. 10017
United States District Court	1. 1001/
Eastern District of The Court	
Eastern District of New York	
Phone Number (212)	421-3400
	3400
ADD ADDITIONAL PAGE IF NECESSARY	
(TO BE COMPLETED BY ATTORNEY) TRANSCR	IPT INFORMATION - FORM B
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Date and The Office ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	To be completed by Court Reporter and forwarded to Court of Appeals.
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STATE OF NEW YORK) COUNTY OF NEW YORK) SS.:

deposes and says that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 2 Charles
is over 18 years of age and resides at a (May 150.)/
Apt #51 10014 NEW Yorks Vist.
That on the 19th day of MARCH, 1976, deponent personally served the within ANELLANT'S APPENDIX
upon the attorneys designated below who represent the indicated parties in this action and at the addresses below
stated which are those that have been designated by said
attorneys for that purpose.

By leaving true copies of same with a duly authorized person at their designated office.

By depositing true copies of same enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper, in the post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United Stated post office department within the State of New York.

Names af attorneys served, together with the names of the clients represented and the attorneys' designated addresses.

> DAVID G. TRAGER ESR. U.S. ATTORNEY-FOR EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF APPELLEE U.S. COULTHOUSE 225 CADMAN PLAZA EAST BROOKLYN, N.Y.

Sworn to before me this

Notary Public, State of New York
No. 03-0930908
Qualified in Bronx County
Commission Expires March 30, 1995